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Morality looms large in our lives. We all note its gravity and can explain some
conception, however vague, of its tenets. Morality represents those aspects of our lives
we consider most meaningful. For all this importance, however, morality has no
heteronymous force over us. Unlike physical forces, such as gravity, to which we must
acquiesce, in accord with our wills or against them, morality cannot make us act in any
certain way. Unlike arguments of science, backed by mathematical formulas and
experimental proofs, morality can only persuade us to adhere to its claims to the extent
we are willing to listen and be persuaded.
This tenuous mix of gravity and seeming powerlessness has encouraged many thinkers
to argue for some conception of a secure foundation for morality. Two of these thinkers,
offering two very different approaches, are Immanuel Kant and Martha Nussbaum. Kant
seeks to ground morality in the objective and unchanging a priori foundation of reason.
Nussbaum redirects the moral moment to the concrete and tangible lived particulars of
our actual lives. Each, however, focuses on too narrow a foundation, thus failing to
provide moral guidance that accurately reflects both the gravity and richness we associate
with the moral life. Kant and Nussbaum commit the errors of rational reductionism and
empirical reductionism, respectively.
In contrast to the moral methods of Kant and Nussbaum, centered coherence provides a
foundation for morality that does not suffer from the same critique of reductionism.
Instead, it describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral guidance and
reflects the gravity and the meaning we recognize in morality.
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1. Introduction: The Force of Morality

Bernard Williams opens his book Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy with a
question posed by Socrates in Plato’s Republic: How should one live?1 It is not a light
question.
Socrates thought it of the utmost importance, and his dialogues continually probe
for clues to the answers. Each of his encounters narrows the range of possible
suggestions. The answers proposed by philosophers since Socrates reflect the weight
Socrates associated with the question. These answers are heavy, often struggling, and too
often freighted with the metaphysical and epistemological baggage of philosophical
argument. As the title of his book suggests, Williams concludes that philosophy cannot
fully address Socrates’ question in a way that meets the standards it has set for itself.
Yet, philosophy has never been able to cease addressing and debating the
question. Each major philosophical school has paid and pays tribute to morality, even if
only to argue against the possibility of any such system. Following Plato, Aristotle wrote
the comprehensive and scientific Ethics. Aquinas’s theological metaphysics, Hume’s
skepticism, Kant’s critical method, and Nietzsche’s indictment of religious pessimism, to
name a few, all provide examinations of morality. In the twentieth century, positivism
sought to excise intangibles from what we consider meaningful. Even the
poststructuralists, after deconstructing every foundation for hegemonic thinking, attempt
to argue for moral positions, although, ironically, their deconstruction attempts can be
attributed to preconceived moral notions. More recently, moral philosophers such as
Martha Nussbaum have sought a different approach. Agreeing with Williams that
philosophy cannot fully answer Socrates’ question, she rejects the traditional methods of
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philosophical discourse as insufficient for addressing moral concerns in favor of the rich
and descriptive medium of fiction.
It is an interesting question why the intellectual and cultural history of the west
places great importance on morality. Why if, as Williams and many other philosophers
conclude, explanations and defenses of morality are not fully compatible with
philosophical argument, does it still receive so much attention by philosophers and even
more attention by society?
At the institutional level, moral language is evident in every context. It is nearly
impossible to listen to a politician speak without hearing words such as “values” and
“integrity.” Businesses convene ethics committees and task forces. Non-profits in every
town strive to fill in the gaps to create a “better” society, however their mission
statements define this, and philanthropic foundations gladly keep them funded. These
foundations have no technical or legal obligation to give out massive quantities of their
money, yet they choose to toil over thousands of grant applications to fund an incredibly
wide range of non-profit activity instead of accumulating wealth for personal use.
At the individual level, people seek moral guidance from syndicated columnists
such as Randy Cohen of the New York Times Magazine or Abigail Van Buren (now
succeeded by her daughter). People seek moral advice from religious and non-religious
sources, such as churches and self-help retreats. Books tell people how to handle every
aspect of their lives, such as how to responsibly spend and invest their money (with a
myriad of authors offering an equal number of definitions of “responsible”), how to
respect their partners, and how to instill values in their children. Everywhere we look,
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there is some form of discussion about morality. Evidently, as Williams also claims, the
insufficiency of philosophy to fully address morality is not the final word on the subject.
We must ask why morality has such a hold on people, both scholars and non
scholars. If philosophy cannot offer a sufficient account for morality, why is it so
beholden to it? Perhaps more importantly, what is the place of morality in human life
that it represents the primary area of overlapping interest between the academic and nonacademic worlds? It would be nothing short of hyperbole to say that the general public
has any interest in the majority of topics discussed among philosophers. Factual
anecdotes about quantum mechanics or a general discussion of skepticism and security of
knowledge might provide interesting dinner party conversation, but to probe either at a
deeper level, such as a presentation of material from original sources on the subject,
would quickly erode interest.
A discussion of morality, however, whether in the form of political theories,
economic disparities, or justifications for individual actions receives a very different
response. People engage in discussions about priorities for the government’s allocation
of money. Unlike other philosophical topics, detailed arguments for whether the income
tax should be flat or graduated, or whether economic growth should occur from the top
down via tax breaks or from the bottom up via direct social funding, maintain public
interest. A subject such as the death penalty rarely keeps a conversation neutral and
uncharged, and the details of arguments underlying various positions in this debate serve
to increase, not decrease, the intensity of interest and, perhaps, tension. Even among
people holding identical beliefs on the subject, a discussion of agreement about the death
penalty, including detailed arguments for either side, will raise hackles.
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The emphasis we place on morality is reflected in the weight we attach to
decisions we would consider moral. We all recognize the difference between situations
and decisions we think contain moral content and those we think do not, and while most
people may struggle if asked to articulate the difference, this difficulty is one of
articulation and does not reflect their inability to note that a difference exists. I want to
be careful not to enforce a dichotomy that separates moral from non-moral, holding
instead that the distinction reflects endpoints on a continuum that, as Socrates’ question
suggests, recognizes the applicability of value judgments across the whole of our lives.
For here, however, the language of dichotomy is useful for demonstrating a recognition
of moral content in our lives. Thus, while the trained scholar may have a greater
awareness of presuppositions containing moral content that underlie decisions that may
not be obviously fraught with moral content, it is the case that people distinguish between
decisions they consider moral and those they think are not, and they are able to recognize
morality in their lives. Again, whether the validity of this distinction holds up to
philosophic scrutiny is a different subject.
A key aspect of the difference between decisions considered to have moral
content and those that do not is the nature of the reasons we give for the decisions. If we
bought a new car and someone asked why we chose a certain car color over another, we
would shrug our shoulders and respond that we simply like it. Perhaps it has been a
favorite color since childhood, or maybe it is the color most displayed in all the
showrooms and magazines. The answer, however, would not draw on principle or deepseated argument.
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If asked why we purchased a certain model over another, however, a wider range
of answers is possible. Cars can be status symbols, and the choice of one over another
reflects awareness of this. However, cars are, primarily, functional possessions; we use
them, and we often use them quite hard. The choice of car model, then, also reflects the
vehicle’s ability to meet our predetermined needs. Weekend summertime visits to the
lake house require a vehicle with sufficient capacity o carry the whole family, the kids’
friends, everybody’s possessions, and food for the weekend. Perhaps the vehicle also
needs to pull a boat trailer. In contrast, a daily commute to work and occasional trips to
the grocery store fit a very different car.
In these examples, we see the introduction of moral content. It would be difficult
to argue that the person purchasing a car for status reasons does so for moral reasons,
though moral issues may be involved. In contrast, the person who can afford a status car
but chooses something of a different character may be acting from the belief that humility
is a virtue, thus deliberately avoiding the ostentatious status car. If we were to ask these
two people why they chose the cars they did, we would find that the nature of the answers
is very different. While it may be the case that the first person’s occupation requires a
certain facade in order to deal effectively with prestigious clients or donors, in truth, very
few people can make such a justification for purchasing a status car. Given the generally
high reliability of new cars today, it is a safe assumption that status cars are purchased for
status reasons. If we asked the second person why he or she purchased a particular car
that is not a status car, we might receive an enlightening reason, such as that it was a
Consumer Digest recommendation. If, however, and perhaps more importantly, we
asked this person why he or she did not purchase the status car, we will most likely
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receive a principled reason. In other words, unlike the person who purchased the status
car for status reasons, this second person could, if pressed, offer a defendable, principled
reason for the choice to purchase a particular car and not the status car.
The point of these examples is to show that a characteristic difference between
decisions considered to have moral content and those that do not lies in the gravity we
perceive in the decision. We attribute a certain significance to those decisions considered
to have moral content, and one way to identify this perceived significance is to note the
reasons we give for making particular decisions. We do not consider our moral decisions
to be based on arbitrary reasons. We do not think our motives as insignificant or
negotiable. Rather, when making a decision we would generally categorize as moral, we
think of our decision as having arisen from some reasoning, or, if the decision has been
made with minimal reasoning, we could, if pressed, offer some justification for our
decision.
While we may cite spontaneity or whim, even arbitrary personal preference, as the
reason for choosing to act in certain ways and not others, such as whether to buy the
midnight blue or arctic teal car, we do not think of these light motives as prompts for the
choices we would customarily describe as having moral content. However, it is
important to note here that these “lighter” decisions are also laden with moral content.
That we do not or cannot defend them reflects our inability to recognize the presence of
morality in these decisions rather than their lack of moral content. Decisions of whim,
then, are not amoral; they simply reside in a realm of decisions we do not customarily
think of as moral. We do not attribute gravity or significance to them in the same way we
do to decisions we understand to contain moral content. In the situation above, then, each
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of the decisions is laden with moral content. However, only the reasons given by the
person who did not purchase the status car reflect the gravity we associate with our moral
decisions.
Again, this discussion gives rise to the already-mentioned dichotomy.
Apparently, we sometimes act outside the realm of moral content, and at times our
actions are laden with moral content. An important side effect of this distinction between
decisions we consider to have moral content and those we think do not is that it creates an
artificial boundary in our lives. The fact that most people can distinguish between the
two decision types, being able to justify and defend certain decisions while remaining
indifferent about others, gives rise to the notion that our moral life is compartmented and
separated from normal, daily living. Now I am making a moral decision; now I am not.
We, of course, do not always think this with each action, but, if pressed, most people
would make the distinction.
Modern moral philosophy has encouraged such thinking. Keeping with the
modern era’s attempts at epistemological certainty, its two most influential moral
thinkers, Kant and Mill, provide comprehensive systems for determining whether actions
are moral. Kant’s categorical imperative allows one to place an action into a formula like
a variable, and then calculate whether it is moral or immoral. In doing so, he encourages
the thinking that separates our lives into moral (moral vs. immoral) and non-moral.
Although M ill’s system and versions of utilitarianism that have followed allow for
greater spontaneity when acting, they nonetheless deepen the lines of thought
distinguishing moral from non-moral action. In either case, they further cement the
appearance of compartmentalization by making the moment of determination a timeless
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abstraction from daily life. To determine whether an action is moral or immoral requires
a pause, the completion of a formula, and then a return to normal living.
Socrates’ question, however, does not imply any such distinction. He simply
asks, How should one live? In doing so, he suggests a different approach, one less
compartmentalized, where life itself and the moral realm are synonymous. His question
encourages us to consider life as a whole, where living well is not an option for certain
times and certain places, but is a mode of living in which we can participate daily. In this
sense, individual acts can be moral or immoral, but their moral significance is not limited
to their inclusion in the moral non-moral divide. Rather, acts take their moral
significance from their place in the organic whole of a life. Socrates’ question prompts
us to apply the same weight we attach to moral decisions and place it on our daily living.
Regardless of how we understand the place of morality in our lives, whether
limited to certain realms or manifest comprehensively across our lives, we continue to
attach greater significance to those actions and decisions we consider to contain moral
content. Why do we take moral decisions so seriously? What is it about them that
prompts us to set them apart from other decisions, to give them a special place of weighty
consideration in our lives?
One aspect of moral decisions that sets them apart from others is that moral
decisions are decisions we can defend. In situations we might consider to be without
moral content, our reasons for making the particular decision we did do not have great'
import to us. We could easily shrug off criticism for the decision because it was one we
do not think of as having arisen from deeply held convictions. Again, this does not
relegate the decision to whim; rather it notes a distinction between decisions deliberately
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and conscientiously made from reasons we can, and would, defend from those where a
request for justification would seem odd. If pressed, we could offer reasons for the
decision, and we could back those reasons with others. Ultimately, we could defend the
decision down to some underlying, fundamental principle we hold in our lives.
This understanding of morality as defendable arises in part from the western
intellectual tradition’s emphasis on rational agency. Presupposed in Socrates’ question,
How should one live? is the understanding that we have the ability to act in different
ways and to conscientiously choose between reasons for acting in different ways.
Presumably, this choice is also a rational one, and, by posing the question, Socrates’
suggests that the answer to the question is capable of being better decided, understood,
and explained through rational examination.
As rational beings, we are not slaves in our daily life to passion, desire, and need.
Rather, we can will in a way that includes principles and reasons. We can also choose to
act in accord with, or contrary to, our reasoning. Moral decisions, then, which, as
defendable, are decisions based on principle although we may not normally articulate the
underlying principle or principles, coincide with a fundamental aspect of who we are as
humans. We are rational, and we possess the agency to rationally decide how to act.
Arguably, this aspect of moral decisions distinguishes them from other decisions we
make that, although they are conscious decisions of ours and not coerced or mere
response to stimuli, do not arise from deeper underlying reasons. We base rational
decisions on defendable, though perhaps slight or superficial, reasons, and, as decisions
we can and do defend with rational argument, moral decisions manifest a fundamental
aspect of our humanity.
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Kant offers us a connection, by use of the will, between rationality and morality.
In Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, he develops this connection by first
establishing the good will as the only thing that could be called good without
qualification, contrasting it with all other traits and qualities that are, ultimately,
corruptible. Gifts of character, such as intelligence, courage, and perseverance, and gifts
of fortune, such as riches, power, and health, may have many good applications and
manifestations, yet none of these can be called good in itself. Rather, each can cause
harm if directed by a will that is not thoroughly good. Unlike these gifts of character and
fortune, the good will is not good “because of what it effects or accomplishes or because
of its competence to achieve some intended end; it is good only because of its willing
(i.e., it is good in itself). . .. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither diminish or augment
this worth.”2
The perfectly good will, however, is rare at best. Our desires and inclinations
prompt us in directions other than those of a good will, and morality is therefore a burden
for us. Kant addresses this burdensomeness by naming reason’s “highest practical
vocation” and “proper function” as producing a will “good in itself and not one good
merely as a means.”3 Thus, the connection between morality and rationality resides in
the association of reason and the will, and the will and morality. The good will is the
proper moral agent; moral actions are those subject to the good will; and it is by reason
that our actions accord with those of the perfectly good will.
Further, we defend morality because it also engages those aspects of us
traditionally considered non-rational. We sense its presence in the prodding and tugging
of our emotions, in decisions we make motivated by love, joy, injustice, or hurt. We, as
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humans, are stirred deeply in the presence of beauty, in all its forms and mediums and in
its particular cultural manifestation, even though we may not each appreciate all of these
varied modes. We hold standards forjudging the qualitative depth of this beauty because
we want to defend its importance to us. These standards use rational language to explain
their judgments, but they are ultimately motivated and upheld by the deeper, intangible
feelings we have in the presence of beauty. Likewise, we may appeal to the language of
traditional rationality to defend a decision motivated by emotion; however, the decisions
themselves arise from aspects of us other than this appeal to rationality. That is, many of
our most profound and potent experiences do not fit neatly into the realm of reason and
rationality. Yet, few of us would deny the important place of these experiences in
defining what it means to be human.
In addition to morality’s relation to our rationality and our emotions, we also
place weight on moral decisions because we tend to understand them to reflect aspects of
our lives more grave than the seeming minutiae that arise during our individual daily
living. One reason for this is that morality often includes overlap between our actions
and the lives of other people, necessarily placing the emphasis somewhere other than on
us. This expands the focus of our accountability, and thus the gravity of morality. It is
important to note here that this accountability is not merely an adherence to social
convention or decorum. We disapprove when people act recklessly in a way that
threatens harm to others not just because it is socially improper; rather, we do so because
we understand harming others to be immoral. Thus, when our moral life overlaps with
the lives of other people, we tangibly recognize that morality represents something
greater than us. We overtly acknowledge morality’s parameters by willingly limiting our
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actions to conformity with those parameters, tacitly admitting that we are acknowledging
a greater entity.4
In contrast to the moral gravity experienced in the presence of others, we tend to
apply a different standard when judging the morality of the action that appears to affect
our own lives only. When alone, it becomes easy to cut corners or to rationalize our
behavior. For example, we may allow a blurring of the line between actions that are selfserving for principled reasons and those that are self-serving out of merely selfish desire.
Our tendency to allow ourselves to become morally sloppy when alone in a way that we
do not when our actions involve other people or are enacted in the presence of other
people demonstrates our recognition that morality entails a force of accountability. It
also demonstrates that a theory of morality must explain and expand this accountability to
apply when we are alone.
Both Aristotle and Kant recognize the need for morality in the context of solo
action. Aristotle describes the virtues as the standards for the proper moral life, and,
though most of the virtues have a social application, some of the virtues he discusses
have application in the absence of other people.5 Temperance, for example, is a virtue
that applies primarily to actions involving oneself only.6 Kant’s three descriptions of the
moral law set the moral law in a social context. Yet he is also careful to provide a
method for determining the morality of actions to oneself. In Foundations, he explains
the categorical imperative’s application to actions that involve ourselves only, and he
prescribes proper action by explaining that we have a duty to ourselves.7
However, while we may agree with either or both of these two systems, they
require some degree of fortitude for their enactment. Unless we exert conscientious self-
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discipline, our sense of accountability in regard to the action is diminished. Both
Aristotle and Kant give us guides for moral action when we are alone, but these guides
are ones we grasp with our minds, leaving them susceptible to our minds’ rationalizing of
other behaviors. That is, because morality presents no heteronymous force in our lives, it
gives us the possibility to act in a way other than what we understand to be the moral
action, a possibility that becomes especially accessible when we are alone. The problem
with each of these systems, then, is that neither appeals to aspects of our lives broader
than our cognitive faculties, and, when we are alone and apart from the gravity of
morality realized in the presence of others, morality is subject to our mind’s ability to
overrule our natural desires.
This reveals the quirk of morality. Morality represents an aspect of our lives that
we consider greater than our own personal whims, yet it cannot force us to act a certain
way. We associate it with our deepest understanding of our rationality. We emphasize
our moral principles, defend the decisions we make from these principles, and take great
strides to abide by these principles and decisions. We recognize the relation between
morality and our most deeply felt emotions and experiences. We understand morality to
represent an aspect of our lives greater than us and willingly subject ourselves to morality
as we are able. Yet, for all this weight we give to morality and its place in our lives, we
can choose, as evidenced particularly when we are alone, to ignore morality’s call and act
in a way other than what we understand to be the moral option.
Further, for all the weight and priority morality has in our lives, it is not only
unable to force us to act in a certain way, but it can only suggest why this certain way is
the right one. We cannot point to a topic or argument, as we might in science, and say,

13

here, this proves it. We may approximate this verification, but even a solid argument
remains dependent on a person’s autonomous acceptance of it. Morality is not backed
with the same argumentative force that a scientific claim may have. Scientific knowledge
can be proven, secured, verified through fact. More importantly, these means for proof
and argument are effective in convincing a skeptic. If someone doubts a scientific claim,
evidence can be given to show these doubts to be unfounded. To deny the evidence and
argument supporting a scientific claim is to deny one’s rationality.
Morality, however, cannot rest on so secure a foundation. Tests and experiments
do not provide it with greater validity, and thus force over us, only with greater
argumentative force to convince us to adhere to its claims. A social survey might reveal
that an overwhelming majority of people hold the same moral position about a particular
issue, or that a majority derive greater happiness from certain activities and not others,
but even this evidence does not equal the force of scientific verification. The tendency
for many of us to slouch morally when alone is evidence of the difference in force
between moral and scientific claims. This does not mean that morality’s force is less
potent than that of science; indeed, many people have moral convictions that are as strong
as the scientifically verifiable aspects of their lives. Rather, the difference is that people,
even those who hold very strong positions on particular moral issues, have the option of
choosing to act or not to act in compliance with those convictions, whereas those same
people cannot for one second deny the claim gravity has on their lives. In both morality
and science, people may deny their rationality and act outside of their understanding of
the supporting arguments, but only the latter can expose this irrationality by demanding
compliance.
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Bernard Williams deems this difference of force a problem for morality, and we
can distinguish two modes of this problem. The first, which is beyond the scope of this
paper, notes that some people may choose to live apart from the orienting framework of a
moral system. For Williams, the possibility of such a skepticism (to be distinguished
from one representing a negative morality in opposition to a perceived morality), presents
a real threat to proponents of the moral debate. At any time, the moral skeptic can simply
opt out. It is important to note that opting out of morality is merely an assertion; no one
can live outside of morality, where one’s actions have no moral significance. The second
mode, which presents a stronger threat of destabilization, notes that moral arguments may
have no force over those who consider themselves within the realm of morality. Here,
there are two ways in which this lack of force can be a problem for morality. First, it
could be the case that the internalized moralities of people who are not skeptics are
fundamentally incompatible. Religious fundamentalism provides many examples,
demonstrating that the force one party’s argument has on another is similar to the force of
a moral argument on the moral skeptic. Second, at any time, those of us who live within
the parameters of a morality can choose to act otherwise than our own convictions, or
those with similar convictions, dictate. Thus, although arguments for a moral position,
whether directed toward the skeptic or toward those, including ourselves, who adhere to
some conception of a defined morality, can carry significant force, this force is
suggestive and unlike arguments of science, which can rationally convince or can be
empirically demonstrated.
Williams discusses these threats as contributing to the search for moral
Archimedean points. As described earlier, moral decisions are ones we defend, and, at
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some point, this defense must rest on some foundational principle. If we state a position
on a particular moral issue, we also must be able to give a reason for why we hold that
position. This reason, however, is also subject to the question Why? and so on. At some
point, this must end. Thus, we come to an Archimedean point underlying a moral
position or a set of individual moral positions. For example, if we claim that capital
punishment is immoral, we will most likely trace this position to an underlying principle
describing the dignity of the individual life. The discussion of a related position, that
capital punishment for the mentally retarded is immoral, rests instead on the principle that
it is unfair to hold all people to the same standard when some are incapable, due to
insurmountable circumstances, to meet the expectations of that standard. While this
principle has overlap with that of respect for human dignity, it is not the same. In
philosophy, we narrow these Archimedean points even further, and Kant grounds human
dignity, for example, in the ability for self-legislation that arises from reason.
The reliance on Archimedean points in morality is especially poignant because of
morality’s inability to enforce itself. The history of philosophy’s reliance on
Archimedean points to support claims about the natural world seldom transferred outside
the classroom or the salon. We avoid touching fire whether we live in a cave, are
monistic or dualistic entities, have any faith in the reliability of our senses, or understand
our last experience with fire as necessarily related to our same unified self. To
proponents of morality, however, Archimedean points have to protect morality from the
vulnerability it otherwise faces. Further, as the past 500 years of human history has been
characterized partly by continued encounters with different worldviews, people’s
understandings of morality appear ever more vulnerable and threatened.
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This thesis will examine the use of Archimedean points by proponents of two
different moral theories. Both Immanuel Kant and Martha Nussbaum seek to ground
their approaches in indubitable foundations. Kant claims we are ultimately rational
beings, and he grounds morality in reason. Arguments directed toward reason can carry
force, because we are all rational and therefore should accord with rational arguments.
Martha Nussbaum, in contrast, seeks to avoid the abstraction of Kant’s metaphysical
claims, and she grounds morality in the tangible details of lived experience. Arguments
offered in appeal to our tangible experience in the world, such as appeals to our emotions,
can also carry force because we are all subject to these same empirical conditions.
The problem of reductionism in each of these approaches is revealed initially in
their incompatibility with one another. Each, in seeking an indubitable foundation for
morality, reduces morality to the limitations of that foundation. In grounding our
morality in reason, Kant denies the tangibles which Nussbaum champions. In grounding
our morality in the tangible contingencies of lived experience, Nussbaum prevents a
reliance on the universality and categoricalness provided by reason. Yet, both of these
foundations are ones we would associate with being human and ones we would consider
important for morality.
What is needed, then, is an approach to morality that can incorporate each of these
components. This incorporation does not come without a price. Its inability to be a priori
and shielded from contingency would displease Kant, and its appeal to a foundation that
resembles a broader, more general system will displease Nussbaum.
This thesis, then, will consist of the following. After a brief discussion of
reductionism and its relation to morality, it will present an overview of Kant’s moral
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system and a critique of this system as rational reductionism. It will then summarize
Nussbaum’s position and critique it as empirical reductionism. The last section will
sketch what an alternative position might look like, how we can ground it, and how we
can access it.

2. Reductionism Explained

Successive attempts to secure the certainty of knowledge characterize the history
of modern philosophy. Following the skepticism of the Renaissance, particularly
Montaigne’s indictment of knowledge derived from the senses, philosophers have sought
to guarantee the validity of our knowledge about ourselves, our knowledge itself, and the
relation of our knowledge of the world around us to the actuality of what this world may
be.8 Coupled with these attempts are countering explanations that deny the certainty of
these various attempts to secure knowledge.
Each of these various positions, whether fitting the rationalist or empiricist
strategy in the history of philosophy, shares a common aspect. In arguing its position,
each relies on a foundational, seemingly-irrefutable starting point. In other words, both
the rationalist and empiricist camps are essentially reductionist, attempting to secure
knowledge about the world, specifically the principles of mathematics and physics, by
reducing the statements of these sciences to statements of indubitable first positions.
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy provides the most notable example of
rationalist reductionism. After intentionally doubting all his senses, thereby disregarding
any knowledge he may have derived from them including the existence of his physical
body, and after attributing all his thoughts to the machinations of an evil genius who
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controls all his thoughts, Descartes concludes that he can know with a priori certainty that
he exists. If he is so deceived, then he must, at minimum, exist as an unextended entity
capable of thinking deceived thought. Cogito ergo sum.9 However, Descartes’ rationalist
reductionism creates an unavoidable problem of mind-body dualism that he and the other
rationalists never successfully resolve. Leibniz, likewise, thought he could reduce all the
statements of a natural science to the statements of logic, thus grounding them within the
a priori principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.10 He too, did not
succeed.
Classical empiricists, such as Locke, make implicit claims that the principles of
science reduce to sense-experience sentences; contemporary empiricists, Wittgenstein in
the Tractatus, for example, make such claims explicitly. Hume provides the most notable
example of the reductionism of classical empiricism, denying both the rationalists’ claims
to a priori knowledge of self and god, as well as other empiricists’ claims about nonsensory knowledge. He rejects, for example, Locke’s description of our intuitive
knowledge of our selves, an assumption crucial to Locke’s empiricism. In contrast,
Hume describes an empiricism so severe that it denies even the concept of causality,
though the events prompting claims of causality, such as the reactive movements of
striking billiard balls, have been demonstrated numerous times. Rather, for Hume, all our
knowledge is a posteriori, and he challenges us to try to find some other source for our
ideas. Thus, even our most complex ideas, such as God or self, are only aggregate things
comprised of other, more simple ideas. Because Hume states that all our ideas come
from our impressions and other ideas, it follows that our idea of God as an infinite
substance comes only from reflecting on our own ideas, and then augmenting them to

19

infinity. Writing roughly one hundred years after Descartes, Hume concludes with a
skepticism more comprehensive than that of Montaigne.
In each case, rationalism or empiricism, the goal of the reduction is to secure the
epistemology underlying claims of science, which is assumed to be dubitable. What is
interesting about the concern over the claims of science and knowledge, however, is that,
at the end of the discussion, we all continue living as though the claims are indubitable.
As Locke notes when rejecting claims that we exist apart from our physical selves, “I
think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows certainly
he exists, and that he is something.”11 He Continues by noting wryly that we can discuss
non-existence or the dubiousness of our senses only until we receive an unpleasant
sensation. A punch in the nose, for example, quickly reminds us of our existence.
The history of modern philosophy demonstrates that efforts to secure claims about
epistemology lead toward reductionism. The effort to establish an indubitable
Archimedean point inevitably defines a concentrated, secure locus. Likewise, moral
positions, which also seek to establish secure foundations for their claims, tend toward
reductionism. However, they differ significantly in that an appeal such as Locke’s to real
life and common sense when defending epistemological certainty does not translate
completely to a discussion of moral foundations in light of moral skepticism. As
described earlier, morality has no irrefutable claims on our lives— or at least none so
pragmatically acceptable— like a punch in the nose does. Although we understand
morality’s gravity, as evidenced through our compliance with its claims in public,
through our desire to comply with its principled statements when alone, and by our
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eagerness to defend its principles, we can always opt out at the end of the discussion if
we so choose. We need not comply.
This susceptibility of morality to skepticism, then, makes reductionism a problem
for theories of morality. Because moral claims represent and reflect our deeply held
beliefs, and because they, unlike a punch in the nose, cannot default to a concrete,
tangible demonstration that we all accept at the end of the day when we finish the
philosophical argument and return home, reductionism appears even more urgent. The
perceived need to secure that which holds a place whose importance is tantamount in our
lives, and yet is ultimately not a mandatory or heteronymous force for us, leads to
definitive attempts to establish an irrefutable foundation for morality. As Kant states in
the Foundations, “Morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as
the guide and supreme norm for their correct estimation is lacking.” 12 If we take morality
seriously, which we should, then we need to ground moral theories in a secure
foundation. However, the reductionism inherent to a defined Archimedean point narrows
conceptions of morality in ways that do not accurately reflect its comprehensive scope in
our lives.
In philosophy, the dominant moral theories tend toward such reductionism. This
thesis will address two of them. First, it will examine Kant’s categorical imperative and
show that this approach, while thorough in its explanation and secure in its foundation, is
ultimately reductionist and collapses into rationalism in a way that diminishes its ability
to accurately address our concrete moral lives. In contrast to Kant, this thesis will also
examine the current work of Martha Nussbaum. She rejects the abstraction of what she
calls a general theory (such as Kant’s) in favor of a system of moral decision making that
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is appropriate to the lived particular details of our moral lives. Nussbaum initially
captures the tangible richness, complexity, and comprehensiveness of our moral lives in a
way that Kant’s abstract, timeless theory does not, but in doing so, her theory collapses
into a fierce empiricism that resembles Hume’s epistemology.
Before proceeding, we might ask whether reductionism, epistemological or moral,
is a problem, because the discussion thus far assumes so. Reductionist theories, in
seeking to establish a claim indubitably, tend toward a narrowness that does not
accurately reflect the very reality they try to explain, and therefore are insufficient
positions. Descartes’ secure claim that he exists, for example, leaves him with the
insurmountable problem of accounting for his physical body. Hume’s strict empiricism,
like the positivism it foreshadows, leaves us with a discouragingly atomistic and
mechanistic view of the world. This view does not even allow us to posit complex,
abstract ideas or values which, as Kant notes, are required for any sense of overarching
coherence in our lives. The failure of each of these reductionist positions to accurately
describe our lives is evident in the fact that we all return to daily life when the discussion
is over. We do not live as dualistic entities, nor do we see continually conjoined events
as eternally coincidental and therefore arbitrary. Rather, we understand each observation
or event in our lives as fitting within the broader story of our lives. Our lives, taken as a
whole, are non-reductionist by nature, and the individual moments that comprise our
broader lives are equally non-reductionist. We do not at any one time point to an event or
sensation and name it as the foundation on which the rest of our life depends. Rather,
these significant moments act as landmarks within the broader scope of a life’s narrative.
From them, we gain reference and direction, and we may even understand them to define
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the reality of daily life or to demarcate the beginnings and endings of individual eras in
our lives, but we do not reduce all our other experiences to these singular moments.
There appears to be a trade off, then, between the grounded security we desire in
our epistemological or moral positions and the ability of these positions to accurately
reflect the full richness and complexity of our lives. If we imagine a continuum where
rational security defines one end and empirical security the other, this tradeoff becomes
easy to pinpoint. As an epistemological or moral theory approaches the end of the
continuum representing rational security, that is, as it tends toward an a priori and
universal foundation, its ability to accurately reflect the reality of our tangible lives
diminishes. Rational reductionism, with its focus on a priori reason, abstracts from the
concrete contingencies that comprise the real fabric of our everyday lives. Likewise, as
we move toward empirical certainty grounded in the individual moments of concrete
experience, we lose the broader necessity and universality that characterize a foundation
based in reason. Ironically, then, empirical reductionism is also an abstraction from the
fabric of life. While it emphasizes the role of these tangible details, it struggles to
connect them, apart from the introduction of presupposed content, into a meaningful
whole representative of our real lives.
This tradeoff between reductionist securities and richness is not so simple or black
and white, and it manifests itself differently in epistemology and morality. For now,
however, we will let it stand. The important point to note here is that reductionist
theories, in seeking to pinpoint the specific and even absolute foundation for our
knowledge of the world or morality, fail to accurately represent the reality of our greater
lives.
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Moral reductionism presents a greater problem than does epistemological
reductionism and is the focus of this thesis. Debates over epistemology end when the
discussion is over and the arguers return to life outside philosophical discussion.
Whether we are dualistic entities or not, we eat when we are hungry. We, the subjects of
our unified or accompanying bodies, feel pain when we are struck, and we feel
psychological pain when hate accompanies this striking. Whether continually conjoined
events are actually so because of causality or coincidence, we function with the
confidence that they are causal. Epistemological skepticism never has us doubting
whether or not we will fall to the ground if we step off a balcony.
Morality, however, which represents or relates to many of our most deeply held
beliefs, cannot simply default to daily life when the discussion is over. There are no
external forces acting on us that morality must account for in the same way that a theory
of epistemology must account for the apparent demands of an apparent physics. Rather,
when the debate over moral theories ends, we, autonomously, must still decide how to
act. Although we cannot live amoral lives apart from moral significance, we can opt into
a particular system of morality. Further, if we choose, generally, to live within a
particular moral framework, we must with each action decide whether we are acting in
accord with what we understand to be morality, and then whether or not we will follow
through with morality’s demands once we have made the judgment. In morality, there is
no recourse to just plain living within the parameters of external forces. We live within
the structure of external civil laws, but this presents different demands than an abstract
system of morality. This is not to distinguish “moral” acts from those daily actions we
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perform without consciously thinking of them as “moral.” Rather, it notes that morality,
unlike epistemology, still requires conscientious consideration for its enactment.
We, of course, do not strictly undergo this deliberation process with each action.
Kant’s categorical imperative implies that we do. Mill and successive utilitarians, on the
other hand, recognize that the relationship of our actions to our understanding of morality
resembles that of our actions to our understanding of epistemological certainty. Similar
to the way that we continue living whether or not we know for sure if our experiences
accurately represent reality, utilitarianism generally concludes that we act for our own
good, and that the aggregate of a society of individuals acting for their own good is a net
positive of good. For Mill, morality is not a struggle over each action, and the difference
between his approach and that of Kant is evident both in the moral decision process and
in the consequences of these decisions. Kant’s perhaps unrealistic continual calculation
with each action assures that we do not act in a way that compromises the dignity of
others or ourselves. Mill concludes Utilitarianism with the admission that some people
may be trampled by others within the pragmatic parameters of his theory, but he carefully
allows for this as long as the aggregate good increases. “All persons are deemed to have
a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognized social expediency [i.e.,
greater aggregate good] requires the reverse.”

1

Although utilitarianism accurately notes that we do not continually struggle under
the burden morality places on each of our decisions, it tends to understate the role and the
scope of morality in our lives. We do not consider morality lightly. It is not an
afterthought or postscript we attach to actions we would have committed anyway. This
retort oversimplifies the utilitarian school, yet it maintains an important distinction.
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Specifically, we act purposefully, conscientiously taking note of our actions in light of
our understandings of morality.
Socrates’ question, How should one live? then, does not represent mere
pondering. We attribute to morality the highest place in our lives, submitting both our
wills and our physical desires to its claims. We also do not perceive morality to be an
abstracted aspect of our lives distinct from the meaning in our lives. While we may
consciously understand certain acts to be laden with more moral content than others, we
do not consider morality to exist in isolated pockets only.
A theory of morality then, must meet these two requirements. It must accurately
encompass the gravity and security we attribute to morality. It must also reflect the
richness and complexity of our individual moral decisions as they relate to the
comprehensive totality of our lives.
A difficulty has arisen, however, with attempts to meet these requirements. As
described earlier, the reductionism inherent to a defined Archimedean point narrows a
conception of morality in a way that conflicts with morality’s comprehensiveness in our
lives. Specifically, the establishment of morality’s rational or empirical security seems to
contradict the richness and complexity of our lives. Likewise, a moral theory that truly
addresses this richness and complexity, focusing on the region of the continuum between
the ends of rationalism and empiricism, appears to spread and therefore thin the locus of a
moral system such that it weakens the secure foundation it needs to have.
The moral theories of Kant and Nussbaum demonstrate the problems of rational
and empirical reductionism in morality. In providing a seemingly irrefutable foundation
for morality that is secured in the a priori, necessary realm of reason, Kant cannot allow
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the contingent, a posteriori details of our lives to provide moral guidance. Yet none of us
would deny the place of love, sympathy, hurt, or anger in our moral lives. Nussbaum
correctly seeks to reinvigorate the richness of the ethical life by grounding it in the
concreteness of experience, including elevating the status of human emotional
intelligence. Yet, in making the lived crux of a moral decision the basis for her theory,
she disrupts— functionally deconstructs— the possibility of a greater moral order, and her
theory resembles a Hume-like empiricism.
The question of interest here is whether or not this security and richness can be
achieved without the reductionism that has thus far accompanied such attempts. And the
answer is probably not. The naming of an Archimedean point necessarily narrows a
moral theory, whether this point be that of abstract rationalism or the tangible
contingencies of a particular moment. Without such a focus, morality is ungrounded,
and, as Kant correctly notes, this is unacceptable.
However, the goal of avoiding the reductionism that has accompanied theories
such as Kant’s or Nussbaum’s is not to extricate a safe moral theory from the foundation
that provides its security. Reductionism, or perhaps concentration, is not itself
detrimental to effective moral theory. It is an unavoidable component of any defense of
morality. The difficulty that Kant and Nussbaum create for their theories is that they
reduce their theories to loci too narrow to accurately address the richness, complexity,
and comprehensiveness of morality in our lives. For Kant, this is the security of a priori
reason. Nussbaum correctly shifts the locus of morality away from the abstraction Kant
gives it, but in describing a moral decision making process dependent on the lived
moments of tangible human life, she is left with a mosaic-like collection of individually-
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meaningful decisions. She must presuppose the overarching moral principles that
provide the comprehensiveness and security to morality.
In contrast, the need is for a re-examination of the nature of the moral life and
moral decisions. Morality needs a secure foundation. But this foundation does not need
to be a singular, narrow point or series of points, as it is for Kant and Nussbaum. We do
not understand our lives as reduced to a singular focus, and morality, which reflects the
comprehensive meaning we find in our lives, also should not be reduced to a narrowly
defined moment.
In the postscript to Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy, Bernard Williams
concludes with the hope that morality will be understood on the bases of truth,
truthfulness, and the meaning of an individual life. By truth, he means the facts of
science; by truthfulness, the ability to recognize our mistakes and then change our
interpretations of these facts; and by the meaning of an individual life, a shifting of the
moral discussion from the abstract argumentation of philosophy to the more tangible
reality of human life.14 Unfortunately, he does not elaborate much more than this. Yet,
these three bases do provide a sort of foundation for morality, but with a twist. They
continue his argument that morality is a different game than traditional philosophy has
made it, one less fitting for traditional argumentation and proof.
With this in mind, then, we can begin to chart an alternative to the theories
provided by Kant and Nussbaum. If we can define a foundation for morality that is still
defendable but avoids the narrow reductionism that has thus far accompanied moral
theories, then we can still provide the security required for morality while accurately
reflecting the richness and complexity that characterizes the moral life. The hope here,
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however optimistic, is that this broader reductionism or concentration will describe a
foundation for morality that, although less secure than more narrow reductionisms, will
carry greater force.
The remainder of this thesis will be written from this perspective.

3. Kant’s Moral Method

In the history of philosophy, Kant’s standard role is that of reconciler of the
claims and failures of his rationalist and empiricist predecessors. Claiming that Hume’s
skepticism woke him from his dogmatic slumber, he establishes a secure foundation for
knowledge and the natural sciences through the introduction of synthetic a priori
judgments in the Critique o f Pure Reason. Such judgments contain both the a priori
security required by the rationalists and the content of experience desired by the
empiricists.
Although the security of the natural sciences figures prominently in Kant’s critical
work, he maintains another focus throughout. In the conclusion to the Critique o f
Practical Reason, Kant writes, “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing
admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected on: the starry
heavens above me and the moral law within me.” 15 An equally pressing goal for Kant,
then, is to also explain the place of morality in our lives. The Critique o f Pure Reason
lays the foundation for the security of our knowledge, and it also provides a framework
for securing morality. As Guyer and Wood state in their introduction to the Critique o f
Pure Reason, Kant’s metaphysical system must effectively explain not only the sciences,
but also God, freedom, and immortality, because our morality has an “inescapable stake”
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in the success of this metaphysics.16 In this section, I will explain Kant’s objectives for a
system of morality, how the introduction of synthetic a priori judgments provides a non
reductionist security for our knowledge, and then how, by analogy, they appear to
provide this same non-reductionist security for morality.
Kant’s objective in defining a system of morality is to insulate morality from any
possibility of contingency. If morality is to give guidance, then it must be objectively
secure— a priori, necessary, and universal— and Kant emphasizes this point. In the
preface to the Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, he states, “Morals themselves
remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as the guide and supreme norm for their
correct estimation is lacking.” 17 Further, a moral law “must imply absolute necessity.”18
Specifically, “All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the
application of law are made conditions of the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect
a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a selfsufficient theory.”19 He asks rhetorically, “Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a
pure moral philosophy which is completely freed from everything which may be only
empirical and thus belong to anthropology?” and then answers in the affirmative.

9ft

In other words, if morality is to fulfill its role as a guide and supreme norm, then
it cannot be the case that morality rests on questionable or moveable grounds. Even if we
accept the security provided by our senses and our experiences, we cannot, as Hume
argues, piece together a complex idea of morality from these empirical snippets,
regardless of how complete the picture they give us may appear. A secure system of
morality cannot be a patchwork of particular responses to particular moral quandaries.
As Kant states, the ground for moral law “must not be sought in the nature of man or in
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the circumstances in which he is placed but a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason,
and that every precept which rests on principles of mere experience... may be called a
practical rule but never a moral law.”

21

Clearly, this necessity is available only a priori in reason. However, Kant has no
interest in the dogmatism of his rationalist predecessors. Therefore, the metaphysics
underlying the moral law he seeks to describe must somehow balance the necessity and
security found only a priori in reason with the equally pressing case against dogmatism.
To accomplish this, Kant offers the transcendental logic, a peculiar system of a priori
knowledge possible only in the presence of sensibility. The full details of this system do
not interest us here, but the form of knowledge Kant’s metaphysics gives us— synthetic a
priori judgments—provides the framework for his explanation of the moral law.
Therefore, because the form of synthetic a priori judgments figures so prominently in a
discussion of Kant’s morality, and later in the critique of his moral system, a brief
explanation is in order.
In the introduction to the Critique o f Pure Reason, Guyer and Wood describe
Kant’s goals as seeking to “not only undermine the arguments of traditional metaphysics
but also to put in their place a scientific metaphysics of his own, which establishes what
can be known a priori but also limits it to that which is required for ordinary experience
and its extension into natural science.” They continue that he, therefore, “had to find a
way to limit the pretensions of the dogmatists while defending metaphysics as a science
which is both possible (as was denied by the skeptics) and necessary (as was denied by
the indifferentists).”22
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Kant’s strongest criticism of the rationalists was his accusation of dogmatism, the
assumption that reason could proceed in explaining metaphysics without an “antecedent
critique of its own capacity.”

'y'X

Kant objects that dogmatic statements make knowledge

claims about metaphysical reality they are not entitled to make, and then he provides this
needed critique by explaining that all cognition of reason must conform to the objects of
experience. This requires the thing in itself, which, depending on how we interpret Kant
on this subject, can place anti-dogmatic parameters on reason. His theory of knowledge,
then, offers a solution that provides both a priori security and synthetic content. The a
priori component provides the required security sought by the rationalists (and Kant), and
possible experience provides the critique—the parameters of content—to limit reason.
The error of the dogmatic reduction of knowledge to reason occurs because rationalism
ignores the validating, and limiting, parameters offered by experience.
Synthetic a priori cognitions, then, offer us what Gordon Brittan Jr. calls the
“really possible” world.24 The thing in itself, accessed in experience, provides the
conditions for the grounding of reason. Although reason can think speculatively beyond
the bounds of experience without erring, it cannot claim knowledge about any such
topics. Thus, Kant explains, we can think of the thing in itself as an object, but we cannot
cognize it as such. This distinction is necessary for valid experience. Otherwise, there
would exist, as he claims, the absurdity of appearances without an object that appears.25
It is also required for limiting the claims of reason, grounding its knowledge within the
parameters of experience.
With this in mind, Brittan argues in K ant’s Theory o f Science that Kant’s
epistemology is anti-reductionist. He posits an alternative to the standard interpretation
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of Kant’s role in the history of philosophy, where Kant reconciles the claims of his
rationalist and empiricist predecessors by his introduction of synthetic a priori judgments.
Brittan’s claim is that each of these positions is essentially reductionist, attempting to
secure knowledge about the world, specifically the principles of mathematics and
physics, by reducing the statements of these sciences to statements of indubitable first
positions. In each case, rationalism or empiricism, the goal of the reduction is to secure
the epistemology underlying claims of science and about the world, which are otherwise
subject to foundationless claims, including skepticism.
Brittan’s alternative to this explanation of Kant describes Kant not as the
dialectical solution to these two schools, merging their positions in synthetic a priori
judgments. Rather, he describes Kant as rejecting the rationalist and empiricist projects
altogether. Kant does not build from their foundations, but views their basic attempts to
secure their positions as misguided. Brittan states, “What Kant wrote constitutes not so
much a reconciliation of ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ as the rejection of a feature they
share in common [their reductionism].”26 Brittan continues that Kant’s Copernican
revolution was not the introduction of synthetic a priori knowledge itself, but his
addressing of the same goal— the security of epistemological knowledge about the
world—by first accepting the principles of science as secure, and then explaining their
metaphysical underpinnings. In the Critique o f Pure Reason, Kant shifts the
epistemological question away from whether knowledge is possible to an explanation of,
given the security of science, how it is possible. By delineating a system for knowledge,
one that is complete and consistent on its own terms, he can offer the real possibility of a
secure science that is nonreductionist. Synthetic a priori knowledge, then, does not
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provide a reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism, but offers a novel,
nonreductionist epistemology.
Kant’s system of morality relies on this same nonreductionist framework. The
categorical imperative, the primary expression of the moral law, is a synthetic a priori
judgment.27 Kant very clearly emphasizes the moral law’s a priori nature, and thus its
required necessity and universality. The law is also synthetic; it has content and cannot
be analytically determined from reason alone. As synthetic and a priori, then, the moral
law appears to avoid a collapse into either position, and it resembles the robustness that
characterizes the real-possibility, synthetic a priori propositions Kant sought for his
epistemology.
To describe the law as both synthetic and a priori depends on Kant’s metaphysics,
specifically the interrelationship of the idea of freedom, autonomy, morality, and the
natural world. Here, I will quote Kant in full:
Categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea of freedom makes
me a member of an intelligible world. Consequently, if I were a member
of that world only, all my actions would always be in accordance with the
autonomy of the will. But since I intuit myself at the same time as a
member of the world of sense, my actions ought to conform to it, and this
categorical ‘ought’ presents a synthetic a priori proposition, since besides
my will affected by my sensuous desires there is added the Idea of exactly
the same will as pure, practical of itself, and belonging to the intelligible
world, which according to reason contains the supreme condition of the
sensuously affected will. It is similar to the manner in which concepts of
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the understanding, which of themselves mean nothing but lawful form in
general, are added to the intuitions of the sensible world, thus rendering
possible a priori synthetic propositions on which all knowledge of a
system of nature rests.28

The moral law is inextricably connected with autonomy, and this autonomy serves
both to give validity to the moral law and to provide the synthetic content of the law.
“All maxims are rejected which are not consistent with the will’s giving universal law.
The will is not only subject to the law, but subject in such a way that it must be conceived
also as itself prescribing the law, of which reason can hold itself to be the author; it is on
O fi

this ground alone that the will is regarded as subject to the law.”

“Reason, therefore,

relates every maxim of the will as giving universal laws to every other will and also to
every action towards itself; it does not do so for the sake of any other practical motive or
future advantage but rather from the Idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys no
law except one which he himself also gives.”31 Only in this way can a moral law be
applicable yet universal and categorical, avoiding the hypothetical status of empirical law
and the coercion of heteronymous forces. Only in this way, by freely willing to act
according to laws we give ourselves in accord with reason, do we act morally.
The interrelation of autonomy and the moral law relies on the presupposed idea of
freedom. Together with God and immortality, freedom is a regulative idea presupposed
by reason. Kant’s proposed regulative ideas serve the purpose of providing a framework
for understanding the spontaneous and particular logic of the categories, but, like the rest
of the transcendental noumenal realm, it cannot be explicitly delineated in a provable
form. Rather, it is an unknowable assumption. Similar to the way we can posit the
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existence of objects-in-themselves apart from our knowing them, we suppose, as ideas,
the existence of God, freedom, and immortality, although we can never know these.
The categorical imperative, then, fulfills the synthetic a priori character of Kant’s
anti-reductionism. Presupposed freedom-in-itself is inextricably intertwined with a
universal, non-contradictory, self-legislated rational component. As a synthetic a priori
statement derived from Kant’s greater metaphysics, then, the categorical imperative
offers us the best expression of morality in our daily lives. It resembles the
nonreductionist robustness of a statement of real possibility, containing both synthetic
and a priori components and avoiding a collapse into either rationalism or empiricism.

4. Critique of Kant’s Method: Rational Reductionism

The strength of Kant’s nonreductionist epistemology lies in his introduction of
transcendental logic, which provides a stable foundation for knowledge and science in a
way that avoids the reductionisms of both his rationalist and empiricist predecessors.
Kant then uses this same system to give his morality the a priori security it requires while
grounding it in an anti-dogmatic foundation.
On closer examination, however, we find that the application of transcendental
logic to morality is not analogous to its role in epistemology. Kant’s discussion of
synthetic a priori propositions differs when knowledge of the physical world is compared
with the moral law. In his epistemology, Kant emphasizes the importance of the
objective thing in itself for restraining reason’s metaphysical speculation. Experience
guides reason’s knowledge claims. This limiting of reason is the motivating force for,
and the primary argument in, the Critique o f Pure Reason. Yet, in his morality, Kant
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appeals to a very different aspect of the thing in itself for the synthetic a priori categorical
imperative, a presupposed freedom of the will proposed by reason.
Although both approaches use synthetic a priori propositions, these propositions
are of a very different nature. Indeed, this reflects his different intents as well. In his
epistemology, he wants to ground reason in experience; in morality, he seeks to purge
any traces of contingency.
In this section, I will critique Kant’s moral system, claiming that his selective use
of the thing in itself results in a system of rational reductionism that is unable to guide
real-life moral decisions. This critique will examine several problems with the
categorical imperative, finding it short on both theoretical and practical levels. First, the
categorical imperative breaks from the parameters Kant establishes for knowledge in the
Critique o f Pure Reason, resulting in rational reductionism. Because of this breach, the
categorical imperative is essentially formalist logic with presupposed moral content, as
Hegel describes. Second, the formalist nature of the categorical imperative fails to reflect
the complexity of real moral dilemmas. The simple examples Kant offers to fit this
formalist framework do not represent the decisions found in moral life, and an
examination of real moral decisions reveals the categorical imperative to be lacking in its
ability to give guidance. Quandaries giving rise to multiple maxims or complex maxims
present very real difficulties for Kant’s system.
The difference between the synthetic a priori nature of Kant’s epistemology and
his theory of morality resides in the role of the thing in itself in each, and, when
explaining the categorical imperative as synthetic a priori, Kant attributes to the thing in
itself a different status than it has in his epistemology. In the Critique o f Pure Reason,
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Kant seeks to limit the metaphysical speculation of reason and provide security for
science, and, in discussing these, he emphasizes knowledge as knowledge of objects. He
implies through this emphasis that the thing in itself provides the grounding for physical
existence and any knowledge of it. In discussing morality, however, he names freedom
of the will—presupposed by reason as a regulative idea—for the synthetic component of
the categorical imperative.
Technically, Kant’s selective use of freedom fits within the parameters of the
synthetic a priori model. It aligns with Brittan’s description of his epistemology’s
Copernican revolution, in which Kant supposes the truth of the complete system and then
explains the arrangement of the components underlying the system. If a complete and
consistent explanation can be given for the components, then there is little reason to
doubt the theory in its completeness. Thus, in the Critique o f Pure Reason, Kant
provides a complete and consistent explanation of transcendental logic, including the
place of the regulative ideas (God, freedom, immortality), all the while being very careful
to keep tabs on reason’s speculative knowledge claims. Within this framework, then,
Kant gives us the analytically-derived form of the categorical imperative, yet he avoids
pure rationalism by building into this form the assent of a free, rational being.
On closer examination, however, we cannot accept this particular use of freedom
to build the synthetic a priori categorical imperative. First, to construct the categorical
imperative, Kant improperly assumes the liberty of discussing the thing in itself as
freedom only. Although he gives a proof in the preface to the Critique o f Pure Reason
for why morality must presuppose freedom, he does not state why the thing in itself is
nothing but freedom.

He does claim that the moral law cannot be heteronymous, and
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thus justifies why the thing in itself s contribution must be freedom. But Kant never
grounds this claim. Explaining the motive is not an argument.
Second, Kant’s use of freedom is also problematic on its own terms. Underlying
this problem of the lack of an argument is the more general fact that, in discussing the
role of freedom, he attempts to delineate the thing in itself. In discussing epistemology in
the Critique o f Pure Reason, Kant is careful to keep the thing in itself as a negative
notion. Although it is thinkable, and although reason can posit freedom, God, and the
immortality of the soul, the thing in itself is unknowable and, therefore, inscrutable in
these terms. When describing the categorical imperative, however, Kant discusses the
thing in itself in positive terms, utilizing it to his benefit. His explanation of the moral
law works because of the uncoercive nature of freedom, yet, in naming freedom, Kant
takes a liberty with the thing in itself to which he is not entitled. Indeed, his positive
definition of the thing in itself as freedom dangerously resembles the dogmatism of
which he so strongly accuses the rationalists, and he commits the very metaphysical
speculation whose arrogance partly motivates the Critique o f Pure Reason.
Yet, still, it appears we can defend Kant’s use of freedom by referring back to the
model underlying his epistemology. If the components contributing to synthetic a priori
propositions hold together in a way that survives logical scrutiny, then we should grant
Kant the possibility of this use of freedom.33 With this selective use of freedom, the
categorical imperative works. That is, it fits the logic of the model he gives us for
synthetic a priori propositions.
This benefit of the doubt, however seamless the argument, does not work with the
categorical imperative in the same way it works with epistemological knowledge. The
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thing in itself as freedom cannot provide the same grounding as the thing in itself as
object can because of the very system for knowledge Kant gives us in the Critique o f
Pure Reason. He argues that we can think of objects giving rise to appearances. That is,
we can know the thing in itself as appearance through the categories, allowing us to posit
it apart from us and give it objective existence.34 As knowable through terms that allow
for concreteness and tangibility, the thing in itself grounds knowledge of the physical
world.
However, while thinking of an uncognized object is possible because we have
appearances of objects, we cannot know or think freedom in this same way. Freedom is
vague and intangible. It is a property of the self, and cannot be known. As a defined
concept, it is a regulative idea posited by reason. An abstract concept, then, freedom
cannot offer the same force of tangibility. We do not have an appearance of freedom
from which to think of the thing in itself as freedom, and, although Kant developed the
categorical imperative as the device to yield the equivalent of appearance, this
equivalency falls short because freedom’s independent existence does not carry the
grounding force required to keep reason from abstraction. Contributing to the synthetic a
priori moral law, then, it cannot serve the same function of grounding reason’s
speculation as an object does when contributing to knowledge. In contrast, freedom itself
seems in need of grounding. I will develop this critique further in this section. For now,
however, the net result of the apparent synthetic a priori categorical imperative is a
reason-based grounding of reason.
Kant’s choice to limit the thing in itself by selectively discussing it as freedom
appears to be an obvious blunder. Surely, the tediously thorough Kant, whose texts
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comprehensively explain his philosophic systems, did not overlook the above difficulties
when writing. He must have foreseen this line of critique, re-examined his theory, and
then proceeded with his writing, having understood it to pass the test. Indeed, his
selective use of freedom has a deliberate purpose that fits well into his broader schematic.
As described in the previous section, Kant desired to remove any traces of
contingency from morality. To guide, morality must have nonempirical foundations.
One of his statements warrants repeating. “All is lost when empirical and therefore
contingent conditions of the application of law are made conditions of the law itself, and
a practice calculated to effect a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed
to predominate over a self-sufficient theory.”35 Here lies the reason for his selective use
of freedom.
Humans distinguish themselves from all other things by their faculty of reason.
“For this reason a rational being must regard itself qua intelligence. .. as belonging to the
world of understanding and not to that of the senses.”

Thus, a rational being cannot

subscribe to the laws of nature (heteronomy), but must think of the causality of its will as
residing in freedom. Specifically, “If we think of ourselves as free, we transport
ourselves into the intelligible world as members of it and know the autonomy of the will
together with its consequence, morality; whereas if we think of ourselves as obligated, we
consider ourselves as belonging both to the world of sense and at the same time to the
intelligible world.”37
Kant discusses the thing in itself in terms of freedom to avoid any empirical
influence or any hint of contingency in the moral law. Freedom, by nature, cannot be
influenced. As a component in the synthetic a priori categorical imperative, then, it
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meets the need for synthetic content in transcendental logic while preserving morality
against the influence of empirical conditions.
Kant recognized that this particular, selective, and limited use of freedom could
lessen the force of the argument. How can an abstract, non-tangible concept proposed by
reason ground the categorical imperative? Therefore, in the Foundations o f the
Metaphysics o f Morals, fearing that freedom would have no force, Kant seeks to attribute
causality to freedom; however, he struggles to define this causality. At best, he describes
how freedom serves as a cause. He begins with an analogy: in the same way that natural
necessity influences the actions of irrational beings, freedom underlies the actions of
rational beings. Defining it negatively, he states that the will of rational beings requires a
presupposed freedom to avoid heteronomy.

Reason does not respond to external

influence. If this were the case, impulse, not reason, would be the source of the will’s
judgments.39 Defining it positively, he explains that the “concept of a causality entails
that of laws according to which something (i.e., the effect) must be established through
something else which we call cause.” Freedom, then, is not lawless, but a “causality of a
particular kind according to immutable laws. Otherwise a free will would be an
absurdity.”40 Freedom, then, serves as a sort of default cause; it fills the place preceding
the action of rational beings that would otherwise be taken by heteronymous sources or
by randomness.
Kant’s argument here makes sense; it is rationally cohesive. Evidently, he
believed it to be sufficient for his needs. Yet, as before, defining the thing in itself as
freedom, even in this positive way, still does not endow it with a grounding force
equivalent to that of an object. The analogy he draws between the causalities of freedom
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and natural necessity fails for the obvious reason that his analogy compares abstract and
tangible forces. While reason responds to freedom and not heteronymous forces, thereby
making freedom the only possible cause for the actions of the will, this does not make it
analogous to the causality of natural forces. Rather, Kant substitutes a structural
equivalency for analogy, distinguishing two types of actions (rational and irrational) and
noting that each is necessarily prompted by some cause, freedom or heteronymous forces,
respectively. That these two concepts fit the same general model does not support the
needed analogy, and the causal nature of freedom remains very different from the notion
of a cause in the real possibility of physics. Even defined positively as a causal force
according to immutable laws, freedom remains a regulative idea of reason itself—a
presupposed device to understand the will as autonomous. As such, it does not arise as
appearance, and we cannot structure it in space and time, anchoring reason in the really
possible world. The categorical imperative therefore fails to achieve the same grounding
that synthetic a priori propositions have in Kant’s epistemology.
Thus, by describing the thing in itself as freedom when defining the categorical
imperative, Kant technically meets the minimum requirements for synthetic a priori
propositions. Yet, limiting the thing in itself to freedom effectively renders the thing in
itself impotent for its role in limiting the speculative claims of reason. With this strategy,
Kant insulates the moral law from its relation to experience, resulting in rational
reductionism.
These theoretical problems give rise to difficulties in the practical application of
the categorical imperative. Kant’s careful construction of the categorical imperative
results in a purely formal rule that fits more in the category of general, rather than
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transcendental, logic. This formal aspect of the categorical imperative results in the need
for empirical guidance, including preconceived definitions of morality and the choice of
maxim.
In the essay “On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical
Use,” Kant provides some background for a discussion of the relationship between the
theory and practice of moral decision making. He defines a theory as “an aggregation of
rules, even of practical ru le s... as long as these rules are thought of as principles
possessing a certain generality and, consequently, as being abstracted from a multitude of
conditions that nonetheless necessarily influence their application.”41 Further
clarification is found in the introduction to the Analytic of Principles, where Kant
distinguishes between general and transcendental logic. General logic, as empty rules,
needs guidance for its application. This guidance comes from judgment, the “faculty for
subsuming under ru le s.. . of determining whether something stands under a given rule.”42
To justify why, or to explain how, something is subsumed under a rule, however, requires
another rule. The application of this rule requires a rule, and so on into infinite regress.
Kant then proposes the notion of “mother-wit” as the solution to this dilemma, an
instinctual ability dictating the proper application of rules 43 And for those without
mother-wit, there are damning examples.
However, these descriptions of application apply to general, not transcendental
logic. Synthetic a priori judgment does not need guidance for its application. Kant
states, “The peculiar thing about transcendental philosophy is this: that in addition to the
ru le ... which is given in the pure concept of the understanding, it can at the same time
indicate a priori the case to which the rales ought to be applied.”44 The reason
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transcendental logic does not require guidance for is application is that “it deals with
concepts that are to be related to their objects a priori.”45 As a synthetic a priori
proposition, then, the categorical imperative belongs to transcendental, not general, logic,
and this application reveals the problem of Kant’s different uses of the thing in itself for
his epistemology and morality. While synthetic a priori propositions about the world do
not need guidance for their application, Kant’s narrowing of the thing in itself to freedom
subjects it to the conditions for the application of a rule. Without an appearance of
freedom, there can be no relation of concepts to objects a priori, and this leaves the
categorical imperative without a priori guidance for its application. It is, in a sense,
empty.
In the second and third sections of the Foundations, Kant seeks to avoid the
critique of emptiness, explaining that the combination of freedom and reason provides
sufficient guidance in the form of the categorical imperative. If we see ourselves as self
legislators according to our endowment of reason, then the only possible rule is the one
Kant has given us in the categorical imperative’s first expression. In this,
universalization and noncontradiction provide the form of the rule to which a free,
rational being would willingly assent. However, as Hegel describes, this content of form
is insufficient for its application.46
Avoiding the infinite regress of rules, then, and disregarding mother-wit, the
categorical imperative still requires guidance. This guidance must be found empirically.
Here, we see why Hegel’s critique of formalism and abstraction from context is so
devastating to the application of the categorical imperative.
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Successful application of the categorical imperative has two parts: choice of
maxim (including its formulation) and universalizing of the maxim. Kant describes the
quandary as the paradigmatic moral situation underlying the need for moral guidance. In
response to a particular quandary, an agent proposes a maxim which, when universalized,
describes whether following through on that maxim is a moral or immoral action. If,
when universalized, the result yields a contradiction or absurdity, enactment of the
maxim would be immoral. If, however, universalization of the maxim does not yield a
contradiction or absurdity, then following through on the proposed maxim is permissible.
The categorical imperative describes the threshold distinguishing immoral from moral,
where moral is defined as that which is permissible or blameless. It cannot describe
variations within the moral nor can it make judgments of better. I will address the issue
of blamelessness later in this section.
The categorical imperative’s content, the form of rational assent to
universalization, is secure as a priori. In giving examples, Kant emphasizes the
effectiveness of universalization as the determiner of morality, and he describes
quandaries that direct us to a single, correct maxim to demonstrate the use of the
categorical imperative.47 In his examples, it is clear that reason does provide adequate
guidance for navigating moral dilemmas. Yet, other situations are not so clear. Consider
the following example, which resembles those Kant offers.
Before leaving for an extended vacation, a woman packaged and hid her silver in
her house. Upon returning, she forgot where she hid it, and, although she searched
everywhere, she could not find it. Believing it to be stolen, she filed a claim with her
insurance company. A representative questioned her extensively and performed

46

background checks, and then awarded her $2,000, the full amount of her claim. Six years
later, however, the woman bought a new house, and, while scrutinizing every inch of her
house while packing for the move, she found the silver hidden in the trash compactor.
Having not used the trash compactor for over ten years, she had literally forgotten that the
appliance was built into the kitchen counter. It had never crossed her mind to check there
for the silver. She immediately called her insurance company to find out where to send
the equivalent sum of money as she received from the claim.
In this situation, when the woman found her silver, she faced a moral quandary.
The insurance company did not know she had her silver, and they had no way to know
this. Thus, free from any heteronymous prompting, the woman had to decide what to do.
Keeping the money would require less effort on her part. However, as a good, but
unwitting, Kantian, she called to return the silver, believing it to be her duty to adhere to
a policy of honesty. It seemed correct to her that every person in this or any conceptually
similar quandary, such as receiving too much change at the cash register or finding a
significant sum of money on the sidewalk, should at least attempt to return the money to
its rightful owner.
Application of the categorical imperative reveals her decision to be moral in
Kant’s terms, and to stop the story here would resemble Kant’s examples. However,
when the woman called her insurance company, it did not want the money. The surprised
representative said that paying for claims is a planned part of the insurance business, and
to go back six years to change the books, correct their taxes, and re-issue their reports for
only $2,000 would be more effort than it is worth. The company told her to just forget it.
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This second part of the story creates an interesting situation for a strict Kantian.
In any subsequent, similar quandary, the woman’s maxim (or the maxim of any person
who has heard this story) must take into account knowledge of the insurance company’s
refusal to accept the return of small claims. Although knowledge of this story is a
4 0

contingent detail, it cannot be ignored.

Universalizing the qualified maxim, however,

would require all people to attempt actions they know to be futile. This qualification
helps illuminate the difficulties that can arise with application of the categorical
imperative in situations other than those Kant gives us and upon a deeper examination of
the ones he provides.
In providing examples to model the categorical imperative, Kant does not
consider the full range of possible quandaries, but carefully crafts quandaries into forms
that achieve the results he seeks. In Foundations, he provides several examples,
presenting both the quandaries and the maxims in broad, general terms. When the
maxims are universalized, the formula successfully resolves the quandaries, neatly
demonstrating the effectiveness of the categorical imperative.49 In “That May be True in
Theory,” he offers an example in much more detail, including the contingent
circumstances of the situation and the emotional sentiments of the trustee. The quandary
is a much more realistic picture of our actual decisions, and the maxims Kant considers
again present an adherence to duty, and not to a form of happiness, as the correct choice.
Here too, however, even with a more richly painted situation, his examples and
approaches to resolving them seem somewhat disingenuous, and we are left with
questions about his method’s effectiveness.
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As mentioned earlier, implementation of the categorical imperative involves two
distinct actions, the choice or formulation of the maxim and its subsequent
universalization. Kant focuses on universalization to emphasize the non-empirical status
of the moral law. However, the first of these actions concerns us here, and a careful
consideration of the details of a quandary reveals where Kant’s approach falls short of
providing guidance in our tangible lives. Specifically, we can identify two problems with
Kant’s examples of quandaries and formulation of maxims, his reliance on preconceived
moral norms and his failure to distinguish between quandaries that are tests and those that
are existential crises. Both problems arise from his attempt to secure the moral law a
priori and become evident when examining the full depth of a quandary’s details.
Consider, for example, the second quandary Kant discusses in Foundations, in
which a man who knows he cannot repay any loan “finds himself forced by need to
borrow money.” The man then proposes to lie about his intention to repay in order to get
the loan. When universalized, this maxim is immoral.50 The example is general and
simple; however, it still reveals the two problems. First, the example, lacking
complicating factors, gives rise to and then tests a maxim of simple honesty, asking
whether the man should deliberately lie. In this, Kant relies on the preconceived and
socially entrenched value of honesty to craft an example and maxim that demonstrates
the effectiveness of the universalization strategy, concluding that lying is immoral.
Kant does not discuss the man’s need, the amount of money, or why he cannot
repay the money, and a consideration of the situation’s potential details shows that the
man may have other options than outright lying, and thus other maxims in addition to the
one Kant thought was the obvious one. Does the man seeking money need to buy
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medicine for a dying child? Could he appeal to someone’s pity, or to his friends, for
assistance? Is his inability to repay it due to a physical handicap or illness, or is the
length of the repayment period too short for his budget to handle it? If it is the latter, why
could the maxim not be to renegotiate the loan in light of the circumstances, persuading
the lender to extend the repayment period? Or, if repayment is the problem and if the
amount of money to be borrowed is small enough, perhaps he could appeal to family
members with a promise to repay it in service rather than money. A full consideration of
details, then, is important, for out of them arises the maxim to be universalized, and this
maxim may not be the single, simple statement embodying preconceived values that Kant
derives from his examples. Although Kant includes a richer set of details in the example
he offers in “This May be True in Theory,” here too he designs the situation to lead to a
single maxim and an outright test of honesty.
The second problem observes that, in addition to the fact that quandaries do not
always reveal entrenched values in neat maxims, a full consideration of details shows that
the resolution of quandaries does not always have the form of a test. Kant does not
distinguish between quandaries that are tests and those that are existential crises. The
moral agent in each of quandaries above simply asks himself, “Should I proceed with this
evident action?” and the answer, via universalization of the maxim, is a simple yes or no.
More often than not, however, quandaries are existential crises, in which the options are
not so clean and the strategy not so simple. These crises have two forms. In one, a
choice must be made between multiple maxims, and, in the other, the maxim is complex
and does not properly fit the universalization strategy. In each case, the categorical
imperative is unable to provide guidance. I will discuss existential crises and decision
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processes thoroughly in the section on Nussbaum’s method. Here, however, it is
important to note that an examination of the details in a quandary, which Kant sought to
purge as factors in the moral decision process, are the essence of these crises.
Even a cursory examination of a moral quandary shows that any quandary may
have more than one possible maxim as solution. The maxims may be very different,
leading to different morally permitted outcomes when they are universalized, yet any
guidance for choosing between them is empirical, based on the contingent particulars of
the situation and taking place chronologically prior to universalization. Because of this,
the decisive focus of the categorical imperative is not the act of universalizing a maxim
as Kant emphasizes, but the choosing of it, an activity that takes place in the contingent
world in response to particular details. Although, in Kant’s examples, universalizing is
taken to dominate the statement of the evident maxim, in reality, the particular details of
a quandary make universalizing subsequent to the choice or formulation of maxims. This
is exactly what Kant did not want. Yet, in his zeal to purge any trace of contingency
from morality, he inaccurately overlooked the categorical imperative’s empirical
composition and failed to recognize the very real possibility of multiple maxims.
In addition to the categorical imperative’s inability to choose between maxims,
complex maxims, arising from a quandary’s details, provide a greater problem for it. In
his examples, Kant only proposes simple maxims as appropriate responses to general
quandaries. However, quandaries are complex, and there is no reason to assume that
maxims are not likewise complex. For example, faced with a moral quandary, a person
may propose a maxim that has two components joined with the conjunction and, or with
the qualifier only if. Thus, to revisit the insurance claim quandary, if the woman involved
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encountered a similar quandary later in life, the categorical imperative would allow her to
qualify her maxim of honesty—try to return the money only if the amount exceeds
$2,000. Otherwise, she would be attempting an action she knows to be futile.51
Complex maxims present a very real problem for the categorical imperative.
Arising from the particulars of the quandary, there is no limit to the number of details,
clauses, and qualifiers they may contain. With the proper mix of qualifying phrases,
maxims could be construed in such a way that otherwise immoral actions become moral.
In other words, since the standard for morality in Kant’s system is only blamelessness,
where we understand the difference between moral (i.e., not immoral) and immoral but
cannot distinguish good and better, complex maxims could serve to talk around the
problem, effectively lowering the threshold by which a maxim qualifies as blameless. It
is easy to extrapolate from the above maxim about returning the money only if it exceeds
a certain quantity to other situations where we tweak qualifying clauses to justify
questionable actions. Avoiding this would require presupposed moral content, as Hegel
describes.
The role of the thing in itself is to provide accountability for the functioning of
reason, and without it reason has no objective grounding. Lacking the requirement of
experience’s contribution to knowledge, reason makes knowledge claims
independently—that is, dogmatically—thus abstracting from its validating content. The
price of this validating, however, is the actual tethering of reason. Synthetic a priori
judgments do not only prevent reason from abstraction; they literally bind reason’s
knowledge claims to experience. This grounding does not strip the a priori characteristics
of necessity and universality from reason, but it does restrict their application. In Kant’s
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epistemology, then, synthetic a priori knowledge is, in a sense, contingent. It has secure
forms, and it contains necessity and universality, but it is ultimately dependent on
experience for its validity. That is, reason’s knowledge claims are dependent. In Kant’s
epistemology, this is not a problem for synthetic a priori propositions, for here, the goal
of such propositions is critique, a delineation of the proper use and scope of reason. For
morality, however, this contingency can be avoided only by abstracting moral claims
from their empirical, anti-dogmatic grounding.
The regulative ideas that guide our knowledge claims, including those of the
categorical imperative, cannot serve to ground the speculations of reason in the same way
that objects can, because the regulative ideas cannot be known. Even though freedom
allows Kant an apparently a priori construction of the moral law, it effectively serves to
abstract moral decisions from the grounding of the thing in itself, which is crucial to their
real application. That is, the thing in itself, qua ground of the moral law, detaches itself
from the thing in itself qua ground of the applicability of the moral law. As such, it
abstracts morality from the really possible world, resulting in rational reductionism, the
dogmatic, reason-based regulation of reason’s claims.

5. Transition: Theory and Practice

Martha Nussbaum disagrees with Kant’s assertion that reason and its formulations
of moral action, such as the categorical imperative, provide adequate guidance for moral
decisions. In Love’s Knowledge, she describes quandaries as rich situations that cannot
be subsumed under Kant’s reductionist expression of the moral law. Nussbaum
emphasizes that moral decisions are complex endeavors that cannot be guided
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sufficiently by general, all-inclusive rules, such as the categorical imperative, because
quandaries are not general. Rather, making informed, correct moral decisions requires
paying attention to the particulars of the situation, and acting appropriately consists of a
response reflective of these particulars. Blunt application of a rule, though the rule may
be internally coherent and rationally consistent, does not suffice for moral guidance. This
is a broad topic, and I will further address Nussbaum’s position in the next section.
Essentially, however, Nussbaum argues that the contingencies Kant wants to purge from
moral decisions provide the very fabric for our moral decisions.
Kant’s moral theory provides us with a system of blamelessness. The person in a
moral quandary proposes a maxim, asking, “Would it be moral to proceed with this
action?” and then applies the categorical imperative. Those actions compatible with
universalization, however, are merely those that are allowable, and they may not
represent any positive definition of the moral. Rather, they are better characterized by
being not immoral. Universalization at best distinguishes between moral and immoral
actions, and, on the moral side, it fails to distinguish between permissible, obligatory, and
super-erogatory actions. Even for those who might prefer Kant’s method of moral
decision making, the categorical imperative cannot guide us in judgments of better or
best. Few of us would agree that normative positions defined negatively carry sufficient
force, let alone sufficient guidance. Judgments of better or best require a conception of
the good, content that must be presupposed in Kant’s system. What Kant gives us, then,
is a comprehensive system for distinguishing between moral and not-moral— a thin
conception of morality. Such a theory stands in contrast to those described as thick or
robust, theories that can lay out a prescription for behavior that is good, not merely not-

54

immoral. Generally, robust theories seek to more accurately reflect the real life aspects
of morality, rejecting methods that abstract or detach morality from the vigor found in
daily life. This may include giving a positive, decision-making role to the emotions,
focusing on contingencies surrounding moral decisions, or considering the place of
surprise or chance in morality.
Each of these possibilities conflicts with Kant’s project, where his overarching
concern was to define an a priori system of morality that insulates morality from any
possibility of contingency. Kant could not accept a morality that had any empirical
qualifications in its definition. Earlier, I quoted him as saying, “All is lost when
empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the application of law are made
conditions of the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect a result made probable by
past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a self-sufficient theory.”

He

continues by explaining that there are no practices not subsumable by theory. Practice is
the application of theory. What works in theory works in practice. If there is conflict
between the two, then the theory needs adjustment. If it is found that a theory is
inadequate for explaining practice, then this is a problem of there being “not enough
theory.” It is not the case that theory, in general, is unable to explain practice. David
Harvey explains this in his book The Condition o f Postmodemity, stating, “The
enlightenment project. . . took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to
any question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally
ordered if we could only picture and represent it rightly.”53
Kant’s position assumes the existence of theory prior to action, whether or not we
manifest and delineate it through writing or action. Our practice does not create new
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theoretical territory; rather, it reveals what already existed and is capable of being
delineated in theory. Novel circumstances, then, are new to us only. They appear on the
surface of already established theoretical foundations, although these foundations may
not yet be delineated.
We can easily imagine the prior existence of theory when discussing physics. The
physical existence of the world can be explained through the interrelationships of
physical forces in time and space according to fixed laws, and any concrete circumstance
or practice can be explained as the manifestation of the theory that explains these
interrelationships. Underlying our activities in the physical world, including those we
undertake voluntarily, is a theoretical framework that we can neither transcend nor avoid.
In our daily lives, we understand our activity in the physical world partly as interactions
with a conglomeration of real forces. However, these forces do not derive their validity
from empirical circumstance; rather, they correspond to theory that can explain them
regardless of whether these forces are manifest.
This conception of theory and practice, however, has interesting results when
applied to morality. When we drop a rock, it falls toward the earth because of the force
of attraction between two masses we call gravity. Morality, however, has no such force
over us. We not only act autonomously within our conception of morality, but we can
autonomously opt whether to acknowledge a particular morality in the first place. Any
prior existence of moral theory consists primarily in the terms we use to describe it.
Whereas, in physics, the theory that is prior to concrete circumstance explains forces
whose relation to us is one of heteronomy and that exist in our lives whether or not we
choose to conscientiously acknowledge them, the theory Kant claims is prior to action in

56

practical morality exists only in the realm of abstract reason. For Kant, morality has an
inherent relation to us because of its grounding in reason. However, due to our being
positioned between desire and Kantian autonomy, this grounding has no compelling force
unless we side with morality. Physics, on the other hand, will reveal itself and impose its
underlying theory to us, even violently, whether we choose to accept it or not.
To discuss practical morality as the application of theory, then, does not have the
same argumentative force as a similar discussion of physics. We may predict action in
the physical world because we understand its underlying theory, and its heteronomy over
us tells us which predictions will work and which will fail. To predict action in the moral
world is always precarious.
In contrast to Kant, Nussbaum relies on Aristotle’s ethics to explain the process of
moral decision making.54 Standards can exist prior to perception, but these are not the
rules against which the morality of an action is compared. Rather, they may exist as
summaries of worthy judgment— guideposts for future decisions that are “valid only to
the extent to which they correctly describe good concrete judgments, and to be assessed,
ultimately, against these.”55 Rules, as formulations stated prior to their application, lack
the subtlety to address the particular details of a complex moral situation, and they lack
the flexibility to incorporate new circumstances. Kant’s appeal to the rationality of
humankind is an attempt to appeal to a rule that is constant, and therefore timeless, in the
face of changing circumstances, however, even this source of constancy proves
insufficient.56
In Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum reveals much of what is wrong with Kant’s
method, and the primary difference between her method and Kant’s can be found in the

57

pivot of the moral decision. For Kant, is a necessary and sufficient theory, secured a
priori in reason. For Nussbaum, the emphasis is quite different, and one Kant explicitly
rejected, the particular, contingent details of each individual moral situation.

6. Nussbaum’s Moral Method

In Love’s Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum presents a substantial alternative to
traditional theories of morality and moral decision making. She presents two major
critiques of standard philosophic morality. First, she redirects the decision process,
focusing it on perception of details particular to a moral situation. In this, she elevates
the place of both contingent circumstances and human emotions, counting each as
essential to a thorough, invested decision process. Second, Nussbaum argues that there is
an organic connection between form and content in written texts, a connection
particularly relevant for morality, and that certain forms are more capable than others of
expressing certain content. Much of the book, then, is devoted to examples
demonstrating the greater effectiveness of fiction over analytic philosophic prose in
communicating moral content. The second critique is not directly relevant to my
discussion here, but, as integral to Nussbaum’s project as a whole, it requires recognition.
In this section, then, I will discuss the theses of Nussbaum as she presents them in Love’s
Knowledge and the lengthy article “In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.” My intent,
as in the section describing Kant’s morality, is not to argue for her, but to give a
sufficient account of her position for use in further discussion.
Fundamental to Nussbaum’s position is the claim that general formulations of
moral theory, expressed prior to any situation calling for a moral decision, are insufficient
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for guidance. She does not want to eliminate general moral rules; rather, she disagrees
with Kant’s under-characterization of humans as intelligent creatures.57 For Nussbaum,
humans’ rational capacities are not a greater part of their composition than are other
characteristics, such as emotions. Thus, the particulars of a situation demanding a moral
decision and our ability to perceive these particulars play an equal, and even greater, role
in the decision than does a rationally pure rule for action.
Nussbaum recognizes that any decision must arise from some starting point, and
that no starting point is neutral. Rather, the starting point for a decision method reflects
that position’s fundamental assumptions about what is important in human morality. It
contains a preconceived bias, determining where those at the method’s decision point
should look for guidance. For this reason, Nussbaum rejects general decision strategies
conceived prior to the strategy’s application, even if this prior formulation withstands
internal critique. That is, her rejection of a theory such as Kant’s reaches beyond a
critique of its formalism or its technical coherence as a philosophic system. Rather,
Nussbaum argues that prior formulations of moral action miss the point completely. She
specifically addresses utilitarianism, both traditional and contemporary, and Kantianism,
rejecting the already value-freighted approaches of both. Utilitarianism relies on a preestablished conception of equality and the value of maximization, thus requiring some
degree of commodification for purposes of comparison. Kantianism, as already
explained, overvalues the role and scope of abstracted reason in moral life.58 Neither of
these approaches captures the true significance of the decision process in human
morality. In contrast to prior formulations, she proposes a reorientation of the decision
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process, “an account of ethical inquiry that will capture what we actually do when we ask
ourselves the most pressing ethical questions.”59
In contrast, Nussbaum claims that acute responsiveness to the contingent
particulars of a moral quandary is the very essence of moral decision making, and she
offers an explanation of ethical reasoning that places primary importance on the
contingent, particular details of each situation calling for an ethical decision. She claims
that ethical decisions are themselves complex endeavors, arising from the complexities
and contingencies found in real life, and that they cannot be subsumed by general
theories of moral reasoning. The particular details of the context of a decision, including
the emotions of the agent, are the details to which we are susceptive as humans, and, only
by being deliberately aware of them can we make proper ethical choices.
Here, Nussbaum’s organic connection thesis begins to develop. She observes that
“an abstract theoretical styles makes, like any other style, a statement about what is
important and what is not, about what faculties of the reader are important for knowing
and what are not.”60 If we understand human life and moral judgment in terms of an
abstract rationality, then a scientific approach makes sense. Here, Wittgenstein’s early
work in the Tractatus is a prime example. However, if we give credit to other aspects of
human judgment, then we should seek a moral guide in keeping with these other aspects,
a narrative of sufficient complexity and depth rather than a thorough bulleted list.
Nussbaum notes this different thought in Wittgenstein’s later Philosophical
Investigations'. “What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments.
There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can
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apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules. What is most difficult here is to put this
indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words.”61
This last sentence illuminates the problem, or richness depending on how one
views it, of this alternative approach to moral judgments. Wittgenstein accurately
captures the underlying debate of competing moral theories with his term correct and
unfalsified indefiniteness. Nussbaum, Wittgenstein, and Williams all recognize that what
is at stake is the applicability of a scientific approach to reasoning in morality. We want
the assurance of correctness, yet, as Kant’s approach reveals, this assurance comes at the
high price of abstraction from the richness of human life. In L ove’s Knowledge, then,
Nussbaum argues that correct and unfalsified indefiniteness is not a complete paradox,
and the lack of security that accompanies non-scientific judgment does not automatically
imply irrationality or unsound judgment. Rather, she relies on Aristotle’s work,
beginning with his discussion of practical wisdom and intelligence. He states, “That
practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is [therefore] evident. As we stated, it is
concerned with ultimate particulars, since the actions to be performed are ultimate
particulars. This means that it is at the opposite pole from intelligence.”
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For Nussbaum

and her appeal to Aristotle, this correct and unfalsified indefiniteness captures the essence
of moral judgment and, perhaps more importantly for philosophical discussion, she
explains that it is an equally rational approach. In doing so, she rejects the necessary
association of rationality and scientific clarity.
Nussbaum argues that sound moral decisions need not be the product of scientific
reasoning by making a strong Aristotelian argument for a more robust conception of
rational judgment. This argument has three primary components. First, it claims that

61

goods, or values, are not all commensurable and therefore cannot be subject to simple
measurement schemes. Second, it places priority on the particularity of singular
judgments, emphasizing their importance over any universal approaches or formulations.
Third, this approach recognizes, in contrast to scientific reasoning, the indispensable
value of the emotions in sound judgment. Together, these components describe a rich
and complete process for making correct moral decisions that reflects the goals of
rational thoroughness and attention to details while avoiding abstraction from those
aspects of our lives we consider morally salient.
Nussbaum’s conception of incommensurability provides the strongest pillar of her
moral theory. Here, she relies heavily on Aristotle’s rejection of any science of
measurement relying on quantitative comparison, specifically the idea that a “single
standard of value can be found and that all rational choice can be recast as a matter of
maximizing our quantities of that value.”

This quantitative measurement comprises

four underlying claims, which she calls metricity, singleness, consequentialism, and end
content. Metricity claims that all the alternatives in a situation of choice have some value
in common and that the rational person will weigh the alternatives based on this value.
Singleness claims that the same metric can be found in all situations of choice.
Consequentialism places the emphasis of rational choice in the end product of the
decision, stating that choices and resultant actions have value as means to this end, but
not in themselves. Finally, end content defines the product to be achieved. Thanks to
Mill, pleasure is the end content that usually comes to mind first, though he was not the
first to propose, or reject, this.
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Nussbaum rejects this science of measurement for the reason that moral
judgments cannot be reduced to these four components, and she turns instead to
Aristotle’s description of decisions between qualitative values.64 Here, she argues that all
goods are not commensurable. This incommensurability has two components, which we
can summarize as individual value and necessary loss. Together, these components keep
the focus of the decision process on the particulars of the current situation and provide
strong argument against all four components of the science of measurement.
Individual value recognizes that, when we choose between worthy alternatives,
we choose based on unique values in each, not by seeing each as representative of a
common value. As Nussbaum concludes from Aristotle’s discussion of the excellences,
we pursue each of these unique values for its own sake. Here, context is important, and
we should note that we are not discussing choices for the purpose of achieving some end.
Thus, for example, if our end need was to move a heavy piano, the unique value of a
pianist’s musical skill would make little contribution. Rather, to achieve this end, we
would compare his level of strength to that of another person who also possesses a unique
set of skills. On the other hand, Hamlet’s choice between becoming his father’s avenger
and not committing murder presents two very different and incommensurable options in a
context very different from the former one of achieving some end. In this case,
consisting of the choice between items, the reasons for choosing one option are quite
distinct from the reasons for not choosing the other. When considering individual value,
then, the “choice among alternatives will involve weighing these distinct natures as
distinct items, and choosing the one that gets chosen for the sake of what it itself is.”65
This is quite distinct from the moral test of the categorical imperative.
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There is a further, and very important, aspect of the incommensurability of
individual values that needs mention. Aristotle discusses this in terms of the excellences,
and Nussbaum broadens it to encompass choice between individual qualitative values.
Namely, the choice between some items is not a choice where the remaining item is
dispensable. Rather, it is often the case that each is an irreplaceable component of the
good life as a composite whole, and a life that lacked either of them “would be deficient
or seriously incomplete, in a way that could not be atoned for by the presence of other
items, in however great a supply.”66
An obvious objection comes to mind here. How, one might ask, can a decision
between two items be made and defended when there is no common basis for
comparison? (This objection becomes even more potent when a choice must be made
between multiple items.) Here, again, Nussbaum redirects the question, reframing it
outside of metrical thinking. Whereas this objection presupposes a dichotomy between
quantitative, and therefore measurable, comparison and mere arbitrariness, asking how a
decision strategy can be rational without some common metric of comparison, she asks
why, when a common standard flattens the richness of the real world, stripping each
component of its distinctive contribution, we would consider deliberation in a way that
eliminates this fullness. To ignore the full complexity and depth of incommensurable
values is equally irrational. She says, “The really rational way to choose, says Aristotle
with great plausibility, is to reflect on and acknowledge the special contribution of each
item, and to make the understanding of that heterogeneity a central part of the subject
matter of deliberation.”
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Understanding many moral decisions as choices between unique and
nonsubstitutable incommensurable goods means that, when a moral quandary presents us
with a choice between two options, the choice of one alternative or good means that we
have not chosen another. There is unavoidable loss in a decision between
incommensurable goods. Unlike a decision based on calculated metricity, or one made to
acquire a desired end, where the deliberation process for the decision ends with the actual
decision, rational choice between incommensurable goods recognizes the loss of the good
not chosen. Here, the temporal nature of a focus on particulars enters the equation.
Whereas the categorical imperative functions in a timeless, abstracted moment where an
agent simply re-enters life and moves on after the decision, ethical decisions between
incommensurable options are not so simple. A decision is not a singular action; it does
not take place in a vacuum, and a rational decision between incommensurable goods for
qualitative reasons does not ignore the recognized loss that must accompany the decision.
The decision is not like a threshold to cross, where deliberation takes place prior to the
threshold (or in an abstracted moment prior to the threshold), and where life simply
continues after the decision. Recognizing the unique contribution of individual options
necessitates a consideration of the greater temporal situation, which includes the sense of
loss that accompanies the unchosen, and thus unavailable, alternative after the decision.
How, then, do we choose? If we reject metricity, singleness, consequentialism,
and end content, and if rationality requires us to recognize the full value of each
incommensurable option, including the known and unavoidable loss of the other
alternatives, then what criteria do we use? Nussbaum answers this with Aristotle’s
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second reason for rejecting the science of measurement: the priority of particulars over
broad principles in practical guidance.
Priority of the particulars rejects the position that “rational choice can be captured
in a system of general rules or principles which can then simply be applied to each new
case.” It thus rejects, for example, the catch-all nature of Kant’s categorical imperative.
Rather, practical wisdom requires the skill of perception for making “concrete situational
judgments.”68 Perception is requisite for responding to novel circumstances and
recognizing the loss that accompanies decisions between incommensurable goods.
Perception also allows for flexibility in moral judgment. Aristotle compares practical
judgment to the practices of medicine and navigation. In each, it is easy see the
important role of prior formulations and strategies. These are indispensable guideposts.
At the same time, it is easy to see that the practical wisdom needed to approach novel
circumstances cannot arise from a set, immovable formulation.
This required flexibility stands in contrast to the connection between support for
general, encompassing rules and commensurability. Nussbaum shows that both general
rules and commensurable standards are approaches to moral navigation seen as
“progressive stratagems that we can use to extricate ourselves from the ethical
vulnerability that arises from the perception of qualitative heterogeneity.”69 This
statement has two important components, a perception of progression and the perceived
insecurity of morality, and critique of each is crucial to Nussbaum’s position. The
concern over insecurity reminds us of the David Harvey quotation cited earlier: “The
enlightenment project took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to any
question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally ordered
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if we could only picture and represent it right.” This control, order, and security was
Kant’s approach, and, if, after critiquing his system, we sought to replace his decision
strategy with a better one, we would not succeed according to Nussbaum. We would
only be making another futile attempt within the same framework of thinking. Thus, her
critique also questions the first part, where a conception of progression is associated with
security. The problem with strategies that seek security through prior formulation and
commensurability is that they face in the wrong direction, asking the wrong initial
questions. The first step, then, is to reorient our thinking about practical judgment away
from the idea that the better system is the one that conflates the qualitative heterogeneity
of our lives.
Instead, an emphasis on perception recognizes that a strict ought cannot
accurately guide all moral situations. Note the contrast between this observation and
Kant’s “So act. . . ” Nussbaum offers three reasons for this flexibility. First, practical
matters are not fixed and predictable. The circumstances that prompted a general rule,
even those surrounding an appeal to the fixed entity reason, limit the rule to that which
has already been experienced. A refocusing on concrete particulars reveals that practical
life may contain surprise. Improvisation, and not fixed rales, may be required. Second,
practical judgment requires flexibility to adjust to the circumstances before it. This is
different from improvisation, where novel circumstances appear at a later place along a
timeline. Flexibility, like improvisation, acknowledges that future, unpredicted
circumstances may arise; it differs by acknowledging also that each situation is too
complex for general rales. Flexibility, then, addresses the depth of each situation. Third,
the priority of perception over general rales recognizes the unique character of each
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situation. Concrete, moral situations may contain “ultimately particular and nonrepeatable elements,” which prevent the universalization of any particular decision.

7fl

Even though some situations may resemble others, it is not appropriate to bluntly, or even
carefully, re-apply decisions. Universalization of a previous judgment is limited by the
contingent details of each additional situation.
For Nussbaum, prioritizing particulars over general rules offers substantial
guidance for navigating complex moral situations. Through careful perception, an agent
recognizes that changing circumstances, the complexity of real life situations, and the
unique and non-repeatable aspects of some situations require an approach to moral
judgment characterized by practical wisdom and not the application of general rules.
This practical wisdom perceives the complex particulars of each situation and acts with
the appropriate level of spontaneity, flexibility, and recognition of uniqueness. However,
even this approach may still resemble the emphasis on rationality promoted by other
theories. A complex utilitarian calculus, for example, is not incompatible with perception
of particulars. Indeed, full perception of particulars, especially those that may arise as a
result of the judgment (thus acknowledging that decisions between incommensurable
goods do not end with the decision), prompt utilitarians to seek simpler applications.
Therefore, Nussbaum emphasizes Aristotle’s third reason for rejecting the science of
measurement, the role of the emotions in moral judgment.71
Here, the objection of irrationality is strongest. The history of philosophy
consists, in part, of a continuous endeavor to purge those aspects of ourselves that may
interfere with knowledge and acute perception of the truth. Plato argues that truth is most
accessible in the absence of bodily distractions, and his forms represent the goals of an
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uncluttered grasping, by the intellect, of that which we only know imperfectly. The
Stoics likewise avoided a role of the emotions. Montaigne’s skepticism specifically notes
that love can seriously misrepresent our lover’s physical beauty to us. For Kant, the
passions are ultimately selfish, directing us toward action other than that pursued by the
perfectly good will. More recently, positivism most poignantly sought to excise
intangibles, such as the emotions, from our grasping of truth. In each of these cases,
then, the emotions are viewed as obstacles clouding our rational perception of truth.
In contrast to this tradition, Nussbaum proposes Aristotle’s twofold role of the
emotions. First, rather than cloud our vision, the emotions add an additional perceptive
ability, helping us grasp the complexities and subtleties in a situation that might
otherwise be overlooked, or intentionally ignored, by reason. This approach is, again,
intricately tied to conceptions of commensurability and our understanding of rationality.
To those opposed to reliance on the emotions, our emotions prevent us from seeing,
rationally, the essence of the situation. They keep us from grasping the metricity of its
core. To Nussbaum, in contrast, the emotions flourish in their role in moral judgment
among incommensurables, and it would be irrational to deny them this place. Some
values may even be perceived more accurately by the emotions than by reason. Moral
knowledge “is not simply intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not even simply
intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is perception. It is seeing a complex, concrete
reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with
imagination and feeling.”72
The second role of the emotions relates to the perceiver. Moral decisions are not
cold, calculated decisions, even when a difficult decision must be made. A hard and
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unavoidable decision between incommensurables should be accompanied by some sort of
struggle or pain in the sensitive agent, and these feelings should not end when the
decision is made. The emotions, then, are not distractions from true perceptions. They
are powerful aides that give us both increased depth of insight and appropriate responses
to our decisions. In emphasizing perception and perception’s emphasis on concrete
particulars, we must remember that the perceiver plays a role at least as important as that
of the contingent details. This tangible contingency of the perceiver is in deliberate
contrast to any system of abstracted decision making.
Nussbaum calls this overall approach “perception as morality.”73 Yet, she
recognizes that perception emphasizing the priority of particulars and guided by the
emotions is only a partial explanation of what needs to happen. Accurate perception
plays an important role in practical wisdom, but it does not comprise the whole of
practical wisdom. An emphasis on the present-tense aspect of perceiving particulars
avoids generalization; however, it appears to suggest a clean palate for each new
decision, which does not help us. Although the categorical imperative overlooks the
richness and complexity of concrete life, it does, after all, give us a strategy for moral
judgment. Universal reason, not practical wisdom, serves as the basis for the categorical
imperative. It is available to every person, and it does not require training or experience
for its application. For this reason, we praise Kant for developing a moral system that
begins with an argument for metaphysical equality and recognizes the dignity inherent to
each person. In contrast, practical wisdom is not available to all from the outset, and
Aristotle describes it as developing over a lifespan.
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This development, then, unless we assume it to be arbitrary or haphazard, implies
a process. Although perception focuses on the particulars of a situation, it would be
uncharacteristic of a perceptive observer to be locked in the present tense and to make
decisions with a narrow range of focus. Rather, we expect her to make connections to
other perceptive judgments and to recognize themes among them. We expect her, if she
remains perceptive, to accumulate such experiences over time, to compare new situations
to prior ones, and to compare the experiences of others against her own. In short, the
continually perceptive person has no choice but to grow in practical wisdom. Here,
Nussbaum suggests a system of dialectic she calls perceptive equilibrium, an approach to
continued moral judgment that comes out of Aristotelian thought.
Aristotle gives us the inclusive dialectic method, and Nussbaum favors this
starting point because its mode provides for “continuity with ‘our actual adventure” ’74
This method compares alternate positions, “holding them up against one another and also
against the participants’ beliefs and feelings, their active sense of life.” It is both
empirical and practical. As empirical, it relies on experience in the real realm of life for
its evidence; as practical, it seeks a picture of life, a mode for us to function well. “The
participants look not for a view that is true by correspondence to some extra-human
reality, but for the best overall fit between a view and what is deepest in human liv es...
for coherence and fit in the web of judgment, feeling, perception, and principle, taken as
a whole.”75
Like the other components of Nussbaum’s perceptive approach to moral
judgment, all positions within perceptive equilibrium are subject to revision. The
particulars of any individual situation may challenge any held understanding. “Nothing
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is held unrevisable in this process, except the very basic logical idea that statement
implies negation, that to assert something is to rule out something else.”76 Further, and
related to her position on commensurability, perceptive equilibrium is “an equilibrium in
which concrete perceptions ‘hang beautifully together,’ both with one another and with
the agent’s general principles; an equilibrium that is always ready to reconstitute itself in
response to the new.”
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Perceptive dialectic consists of two competing elements. On the one hand, the
approach is one of dialectic. Perception and increased wisdom are, to some degree,
inseparable; this process of continued perception and comparison is the accumulation of
practical experience. On the other hand, her description of perceptive equilibrium, in
which individual perceptions “hang beautifully together,” is anti-hegemonic. New
perceptions can at any time challenge existing wisdom and rules that have arisen from
accumulated concrete, perceptive experiences, and these challenges may dictate a
rewriting of experience, or they may co-exist in a state of tension. This mosaic-like
coexistence maintains the richness and complexity of a morality that recognizes
incommensurables.
There is a further layer of incommensurability, however, that even perceptive
equilibrium cannot address. Nussbaum suggests that a sustained equilibrium, even one of
tension where elements hang beautifully together, may not be possible, resulting in an
end condition that is not really an end. She calls it perceptive oscillation. Perceptive
oscillation recognizes that even a method of acute perception may still be too much
method, resembling too closely the timelessness of the categorical imperative. Her point
here is that the reflection that necessarily accompanies the comparison inherent to
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dialectical perception is itself a moment distinct from the actual living of life, that to be
immersed in the potential depths of experience does not allow us to perceive the needs of
those around us, to be finely aware in a way that promotes perceptive reflection and
equilibrium. To recognize this “complicates still further our idea of what might be the
t

practical goal of ethical inquiry.”

Specifically,

[the] recognition that there is a view of the world from passion’s point of
view, and that this view is closed to the perceiver, shows us that
perception is, even by its own lights, incomplete. The perceiver as
perceiver cannot see it all; to get the whole he must at times stop being the
sort of person who cares for wholeness.. . . For so long as our eyes are
open, we are wonderful and lovable and finely responsive; but when we
immerse ourselves in the most powerful responses, entering silence,
closing our eyes, are we then capable at all of asking questions about our
friends, of thinking of the good of the community?. .. Without this depth
life seems incomplete and perception itself seems blind; but it cannot itself
be ordered inside the equilibrium of perception or seen by its fine-tuned
-7Q

vision of the complete life.

To acknowledge this oscillation is to reconsider the question “How should one
live?” Thus far, we have proceeded with Nussbaum’s holistic, comprehensive approach
to moral judgment with the assumption that this question and her method, by eradicating
the artificial distinctions between moral and non-moral and refocusing moral inquiry on
the concrete particulars of each real-life situation we face as emotional beings, presents
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the condition we should aspire to as moral beings. Here, however, Nussbaum
distinguishes moral judgment that considers the emotions from our sometimes-state of
immersion in the emotions themselves, a state that is not commensurable with that of the
perceptive judge.
Without this emotional immersion, we are, perhaps, still too rational fo r.
Nussbaum. If we are to respond to situations perceptively and in keeping with our
emotional knowledge, then this condition is food for our practical wisdom. She observes,
“If there is for us any prospect held out for a life that combines fine perception with the
silence and the hidden vision of love, it would only be in a condition that is not itself
‘equilibrium’ at all, but an unsteady oscillation between blindness and openness,
exclusivity and general concern, fine reading of life and the immersion of love.”

OA

This oscillation asks us not only to reconsider the question “How should one
live?” Rather, it also acknowledges the “limits of that ethical question itself. It gestures
toward the limits of ethical consciousness, making us aware of the deep elements in our
ethical life that in their violence or intensity lead us outside of the ethical attitude
Q 1

altogether, outside of the quest for balanced vision and perfect rightness.”

Here, then, is

the final blurring, the end condition of our ethical inquiry in which perception and
immersion oscillate, distinct and yet unified, in a way that makes all we know the ethical
life or, simply, the human life.

7. Critique of Nussbaum’s Method: Empirical Reductionism

In this section, I will critique Martha Nussbaum’s foundation for moral judgment.
This will be unlike my Kant critique, where I reject his fundamental emphasis as

74

misplaced, though finding parts worth exploring.82 Specifically, the accessibility of
reason, and thus dignity, to all, especially as expressed via the moral law’s discussion of
means and ends, provides a remarkable account of moral equality. In a somewhat
different fashion, I sympathize with Nussbaum’s project as a whole and agree
enthusiastically that her refocusing of the moral discussion is correctly placed. Concrete,
tangible life, including the emotions, must be a foundation for moral clarity. Further,
although it is not a point I wish to develop here, literary narrative may be the necessary
technique for shifting philosophic approaches to morality from the abstract to the
concrete, and Nussbaum’s pioneering work here is indispensable to this position.
I will limit my disagreement with Nussbaum to one aspect of her project. There
are practical difficulties with her approach, such as the overwhelming task of integration
that inevitably results from a full consideration of particulars— a critique we can
recognize without falling back into a system of metricity and singleness. Full perception
of the detail temporality and the resultant, nearly-infinite range of potential effects our
decisions may have on others over time can paralyze the decision process.
Where I disagree with Nussbaum is in her lack of a substantially-grounded
normative position. This statement requires further clarification, especially since
Nussbaum’s rejection of abstract morality seems to offer us exactly the substance
otherwise lacking, and I will develop this claim in this section. For now, however, I hold
that Nussbaum’s approach is fundamentally descriptive and, as such, fails to be
sufficiently normative.

o-a

From within a position of morality, she offers us a thorough

discussion of the process of moral judgment, including which steps should be taken to
better this process. She calls her position “perception as morality,” and while
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maintaining the position that a process that is not abstract is better than an abstract one
because it accords better with the actual fabric of our moral lives, she does not offer a
sufficient account of the what of this fabric.84 A thorough discussion of how our moral
lives actually work and which approach is therefore most fitting still does not offer us
Oc

guidance for determining moral direction unless we presuppose norms of some sort.

In

short, what Nussbaum gives us is a thorough description of the concreteness of our moral
lives and a corresponding argument for why her approach is most appropriate to it, all
without taking a substantial position as to its content. We are left, then, with a
description of a thick moral decision process whose locus is the details of individual,
particular situations that does not provide the foundation to connect these instances into a
normative whole. Here, we are reminded of Hume, and I therefore call her moral
position empirical reductionism.
This critique will have two parts. First, it will present her position as
fundamentally descriptive, and therefore Humean in its lack of necessary coherence.
Second, it will examine why such an approach is problematic for morality. Again, it is
important to clarify that I agree with much of Nussbaum’s overall account of the process
of making moral judgments, as well as her shifting of the moral crux from prior theory to
tangible experience, and I argue rather that she shifts the locus of moral guidance too far
into subjective, lived human experience, thereby failing to ground it in a way that
provides broader continuity between individual situations involving moral content.
Before presenting my critique of Nussbaum’s position in Love’s Knowledge,
however, it is necessary here to address an essay published two years after Love’s
Knowledge, in which she offers what she considers to be a thorough account of a
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substantive foundation for normative content.86 Her argument in the essay is interesting;
she defends a position of human essentialism while rejecting any claims of metaphysical
realism. Here, definitions are important. Nussbaum begins by distinguishing
metaphysical-realist essentialism from what she calls internalist essentialism.
“Metaphysical realism claims that there is some determinate way that the world is apart
from the interpretive workings of the cognitive faculties of living beings. A description
of the world is true just in case it corresponds to that independently existing structure,
false insofar as it does not so correspond.”87 Nussbaum rejects metaphysical realism as a
foundation for human interaction with the world and for normative content, claiming that
it wilts under even mild skepticism, for it requires access, preferably apart from human
mediation, to the truth of this independent, external structure. Therefore, in contrast to
such a metaphysics and in keeping with her focus on the human realm, Nussbaum claims
that a form of essentialism is still possible, where the “deepest examination of human
history and human cognition from within still reveals a more or less determinate account
of the human being, one that divides its essential from its accidental properties.”
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then proceeds with an account of this essentialism, arguing for a politics that guarantees,
at minimum, the fulfillment of human essential needs and qualities.
Nussbaum clearly describes the origin of her essentialist claims, recognizing from
the outset that she considers a human account of human needs and understanding to be
the only legitimate form for such an account. She states that her position is “emphatically
not metaphysical.”
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In rejecting a metaphysical realism, however, Nussbaum is careful

to avoid any relativist shift into the other end of the spectrum. She rejects the assumed,
general understanding of the Academy, where “the collapse of metaphysical realism is
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taken to entail not only the collapse of essentialism about the human being but also a
retreat into an extreme relativism, or even subjectivism, about all questions of
evaluation.”90 In contrast, she argues for the existence of an indubitable human
essentialism, founded internally and grasped concretely.
She begins by enumerating a list of properties that describes non-negotiable
humanness.91 I will not duplicate the list, but some examples include the housing of life
within “bodies of a certain sort,” a finite lifespan and the corresponding recognition of
earthly mortality, “separateness” (an understanding of the individual human as a distinct
entity separated in mind and body from others), and a “sense of affiliation and concern
for other human beings.” Importantly, Nussbaum recognizes the influencing role of
culture, religion, and metaphysics when detailing this list, and she is careful to distinguish
her account of essentialism. Thus, when discussing the common feature of life housed
within a body, she acknowledges and then avoids the potentially varied cultural,
religious, and metaphysical understandings of this concept in favor of indisputable
features such as the need for food, drink, and shelter. All such lists encounter difficulties
with stringent critical theorists, but it is, nonetheless, a list difficult to disagree with.
Nussbaum continues by then enumerating a list of “basic human functional
capabilities” that arise from the characteristics of essential humanness.92 These
capabilities represent specific aspects, arising from the first list, of what she calls the
“thick vague theory of the good.”93 This list contains normative content; it is thick to
contrast minimalist theories of the good; and it is vague so that it has flexibility to
accommodate the varied terrain of human life on our planet. The list describes the type
of life that should be expected given the essentialist description of the first list. Thus, for
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example, the functional capability that arises from the fact of inevitable human mortality
states, “Being able to live to the end of a complete human life as far as it possible; not
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.”94
Her argument here is that if we accept the first list, then we will accept the second
one. Whether we choose to act on the obligations of the second list in a way that makes
the capabilities accessible to others is our choice, but we cannot deny the natural
connection between the two— to deny the functional capabilities is to deprive people of
their essential humanness. Interestingly, to ignore the second list is, by her terms, to fail
to be human by the conditions set out in the first list. That is, by not recognizing the
basic human rights of the second list, we fall short of the characteristic to “recognize and
feel some sense of affiliation and concern for other human beings,” thereby failing, by
our actions, to qualify for the essentialism in the first list. Assumed qualification for the
first list, in turn, binds us to the second list. Further, consistently with her discussion of
commensurability in Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum states, “The Aristotelian essentialist
claims that a life that lacks any one of these, no matter what else it has, will be lacking in
humanness.”95 I will address the implications of these claims for morality at the end of
this section. For now, my focus is on the relationship of Nussbaum’s essentialist claims
to her description of moral judgments in Love’s Knowledge and to my critique of them.
Nussbaum’s description of essentialism is important to my critique of her
discussion of moral judgment in Love’s Knowledge because it appears to provide a basis
for moral judgment in a way that serves to ground the otherwise disconnected instances
of moral decisions arising from a focus on particulars. The critique I intend to make
describes Nussbaum’s emphasis on particulars as the basis for moral judgment as
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ultimately Humean, that is, while empirically rich in each instance, they contain no
underlying foundation for their overlap apart from what we choose to bring to our
interpretation of them. In contrast, essentialism offers such a foundation: shared, nonnegotiable humanness. This essentialism is not a metaphysical position, but, as
Nussbaum describes it, it provides a base that has been relatively consistent across human
history and is sufficiently insulated from critical attacks on its position. It stands in sharp
contrast to cultural relativism, subjectivism, and other such interpretative frameworks. In
“Aristotelian Essentialism,” it serves as the platform from which Nussbaum argues for a
normative politics, and in this context it is a strong base.96
This context of politics and international human rights, however, is not the
context of individual moral decisions, and it would be improper to rely on Nussbaum’s
account of essentialism to provide the thread of consistency running through all moral
judgments made from an emotionally-guided, acute perception of particulars. In Love’s
Knowledge, Nussbaum emphasizes the priority of the particular situation over general
strategy and, within this, the priority of the particular details unique to a situation. The
guiding list of functional capabilities, however, is general. Its points advise broad and
generic principles for action, applicable in all situations. Nussbaum calls these points
vague, encouraging malleability when interpreting and applying these principles across a
diverse range of cultures. Yet, there is an unmistakable gap between malleability as
cultural inclusiveness and malleability as acute response to particulars. The first relates
to the broader functional capabilities and remains general; the second describes
Aristotelian perception within unique situations as Nussbaum presents it in Love’s
Knowledge.
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This distinction is the functional difference between a priori and a posteriori
theory—the great difference between fitting a prior formulation (whether grounded in
abstract, metaphysical reason or the essentialism of lived experience) into the context of
an individual situation and deriving a judgment through careful perception. Nussbaum
grounds her prior formulation in the empirical world— the lived understanding of human
essentialness— and not the abstracted realm of reason. She thus provides tangible
contrast to Kant on the theoretical level. However, the relation of this theory to practice
brings us back to the two types of theory-practice relations Kant describes. I will quote
them again: “All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the
application of law are made conditions of the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect
a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a selfsufficient theory;”97 and, “Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral
philosophy which is completely freed from everything which may be only empirical and
thus belong to anthropology?” 98 Thus, although Nussbaum derives her essentialism from
an internalist human position and does not seek an a priori foundation like Kant, the
distinction he makes between the two types of guidance describes the difference of the
two approaches Nussbaum gives us in “Aristotelian Essentialism” and Love’s
Knowledge.
In defense of Nussbaum, it is important to note that this essentialism is designed
for political action. Government-level policies are general; guiding international
decisions about human rights cannot be too particular. Her thesis in “Aristotelian
Essentialism” is a deliberate contrast to the academic ennui toward social injustices in the
name of pluralism and diversity. It provides a baseline for evaluation. Thus, we should
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not criticize the relation of this essentialism to her position about particulars too much.
The point here is to observe that the essentialism she describes cannot serve as the
foundation that connects individual moral responses to the particulars of unique
situations. The two lists in “Aristotelian Essentialism,” then, cannot serve as a rebuttal to
the critique of disconnectedness in Love’s Knowledge.
Before moving on, there is one additional clarification. It could be argued that
essential humanness serves as the backdrop against which we perceive particulars in our
moral lives. The lists of essential characteristics and functional capabilities, then,
function as parameters demarcating the realm in which correct moral judgment can be
found, but we still respond to the particulars we perceive in each individual situation we
encounter. The variety of judgments, however, based on the particulars of individual
situations, is almost limitless, at best hemmed in by only the most fundamental aspect of
shared humanity. If we understand the relationship of humanness to particular situations
in this way, it only seems as though the generality of essentialism can guide us through
individual moral judgments. Nussbaum’s essentialism, though connecting to morality as
perception by providing necessary conditions that put restrictions on what is permissible
moral perception, still leaves us with a gap between these minimal necessary conditions
and the guidance required for a more nearly sufficient conception of the proper moral
life.
Further, here also we find ourselves just relying on prior formulations. Although
Nussbaum’s appeal to essentialism is not Kant’s appeal to reason, it does similarly
describe a method in which we approach the details of a particular moral situation with a
preconceived strategy for navigating the details to reach a decision. This backdrop—the
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context of life—is what we reference for determining moral correctness. The difference
between appealing to Nussbaum’s essentialism or Kant’s reason when seeking a
foundation for morality is merely the difference between internalist and metaphysical
realism. As frameworks for understanding morality in theory, they are both helpful in
their own ways. As strategies for navigating individual moral decisions in practice, they
are both prior formulations that fall short of fully addressing the unpredictable uniqueness
of an individual moral decision. Here, the similarity is great. Nussbaum appeals to
shared humanness known from experience, and Kantians appeals to the dignity inherent
in each person as a result of being human. We cannot, then, draw on her discussion of
essentialism when seeking a foundation from which to draw or a backdrop from which to
navigate when approaching moral judgment as she describes in Love’s Knowledge.
As discussed in the previous section, Nussbaum offers a thorough account for the
process of moral judgment in Love’s Knowledge. Claiming the incommensurability of
values, the priority of the particular over the general, and the validated, important role of
the emotions, she refocuses the moral decision process from the realm of simplified,
general, and abstract thought to the lived, concrete experience of the given situation.
This refocusing places the locus of our moral lives where we actually live, even in the
contingent details of a particular situation, acknowledging that, while we may be
reflective about our decisions during the process, most decisions and actions take place in
the lived crux of life.
When Kant secured the moral law in a priori reason, he did so to provide it with
continuity through an immovable foundation, to remove the possibilities of contingency
and exception. In contrast, Nussbaum makes this very contingency her emphasis, even
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discussing the importance of surprise." Indeed, this is her goal, to retrieve morality from
generality and abstraction, placing it in the lived tangibility of human life. Kant also
sought, however, to establish a metaphysical foundation for morality, which he
understood as necessary for this continuity. Without a common foundation from which
each instance of the moral life can draw, morality would be secondary to the material at
hand— it would be, in a sense the dependent result of connecting the dots of individual
situations calling for moral content. It is again the relation of self-sufficient theory to
practice, and for morality, which Kant describes as supreme norm and guide, the
foundation cannot be secondary.
Nussbaum is correct in her realignment of the moral emphasis. We certainly do
not make moral decisions in abstracted, timeless moments apart from the details of the
situation, including our emotional responses to the situation. Her realignment also
revives the idea that values are not commensurable, and to seek a single metric to
compare them flattens the richness of lived moral experience. In Love’s Knowledge,
however, Nussbaum’s discussion of the moral life leaves itself open to the critique that it
creates a disconnect between individual situations of moral judgment. Although the
perceptive agent will draw on prior experience and will be able to imagine analogous
situations for the purpose of comparison and contrast, there is no necessary, underlying
similarity.
This disconnect happens in two ways. First, Nussbaum’s discussion of the moral
judgment process is limited to a description of the process. Her emphasis on perception,
details, incommensurability, and emotions tells us where to look for guidance when
navigating moral decisions, but it does not guide us through this content. We know
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specifically which data are pertinent, and she tells us that decisions made from acute
perception are better than those made more bluntly, but she does not provide a foundation
for judging which of these acutely perceptive decisions is better, other than leaving us to
assume that a more perceptive decision is better than a less perceptive one.100 Her
position of perception as morality, then, is fundamentally descriptive, explaining which
decision process is better, and why, without guiding us as to which decision is itself
better, and why.101 To make this latter judgment, we need to insert presupposed norms or
deduce similarity in content from several decisions Nussbaum would deem morally
correct (begging the question by what norms she deems them correct). Using the method
she gives us in Love’s Knowledge, we will accumulate a string of decisions made with the
correct judgment technique, yet without the security of knowing we judged correctly.
Second, because of the descriptive nature of her approach, when Nussbaum
emphasizes the role of perception to the degree she does, she creates a situation where
morality’s shape is subject to the shape of individual experiences and an individual’s
experience, not an integral, foundational component of a greater, human experience.102 A
new set of particulars, unique either to an individual, or to general history for that matter,
may dictate a morally correct decision contradictory to one made previously, even if the
previous decision is still understood as correct at the time of the latter decision. This
allows both to be morally correct and, at the same time, contradictory. Without
developing any examples here, a brief consideration of telling “white lies” to avoid
hurting a person’s feelings at a crucially sensitive moment in his or her life gives us a
good starting point for understanding how a morally correct decision may differ
according to circumstances. We may bring some preconceived conception of correct
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judgment regarding truthfulness, honesty, respect, and friendship to the situation, but any
correct decision will be determinable only after a consideration of the contingencies of
that situation, including the current and future emotional states of the other party.
Further, and equally important, the judgment we reach will not be repeatable, because the
details of the situation are not likely to reoccur. Nussbaum addresses this non
repeatability arising from the uniqueness of a particular decision in her discussion
distinguishing general and universal principles.103
Together, these two aspects of Nussbaum’s approach reveal the problem that
arises with her approach. The emphasis on perception and method as the mode for
determining moral rectitude and a dependence on particulars and uniqueness as moral
guides narrow the scope of morality. They create a disconnect between individual
instances of moral judgment such that assurance of moral rectitude is reducible to, and
limited to, these singular situations. There is an irony here. While reinvigorating the
moral life by emphasizing the tangible contingencies we know and feel in actual human
life, Nussbaum actually limits the richness of this moral life by focusing it on the singular
situation, stripping it of depth and comprehensiveness. This degree of narrowing and
focusing may not be her intent; however, it is the functional effect of her approach. It
stands in stark contrast to the abstraction and timelessness of Kant’s approach, yet it does
not accomplish the thickening of morality as she suggests it does. Instead, we are
reminded of Hume, both in the emphasis on empirical description and in the lack of
necessary connection between separate occasions of similar activity. What we can know
is what we observe, and we can have no assurance that any observation (or moral
decision) will be repeatable. Because of the restrictions inherent to uniqueness and
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particularity, we can only cross-check with other similar moral decisions, and any overlap
between them will be on a level of generality only mildly helpful when facing a unique
situation. In practice, then, Nussbaum leaves us with an empirical reductionism that
cannot provide us with a sufficient standard for morality as Kant claims is needed in the
Foundations and as Nussbaum presupposes in her discussion of essentialism.
Two objections in defense of Nussbaum arise here. First, her description of
dialectical understanding and eventual perceptive equilibrium provides a basis for a
coherent practical wisdom. Individual decisions are not, then, isolated instances,
anchorless and subject to contingent circumstances. Rather, a dialectical understanding
of morality provides the foundation against which we compare and evaluate new
circumstances. It is a lifelong process, rich in perceptive content and inclusive of our
mistakes. Future and completely unique circumstances, then, although calling for a
perceptive judgment singular to the situation, are understood in terms of this accumulated
practical wisdom. Their ability to redirect morality through their difference is mitigated
by the accumulation of this lifelong wisdom. Further, and importantly, we do not
encounter new circumstances and compare them to this understanding solely in a
calculated, rational way, but we perceive and process with help from the imagination and
the feeling of the soul. This perceptive dialectic, then, provides a thorough account for
our understanding of morality.
Second, her approach is, after all, what we do when making moral decisions. She
accurately represents the most realistic and plausible alternative to academic discussions
of morality, and she succeeds in presenting “an account of ethical inquiry that will
capture what we actually do when we ask ourselves the most pressing ethical
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questions.”104 To bring a philosophical, analytical critique to her method places morality
back into the realm of abstract theory and exhibits exactly what she is rejecting. I will
address each of these objections here, although the latter depends on the fuller discussion
in the following section.
Two problems arise with Nussbaum’s discussion of dialectic. In the first place,
the standard process of dialectic is one of incorporation— sublation into a new whole.
Application of this standard understanding of dialectic to perception and morality gives
us an eventual generality rather than a rich equilibrium of incommensurables. We do not
need to think of this generality as generic; it can still be thick and complex. However, as
an agent becomes more finely aware and richly responsible, that is, as the moral agent
dialectically accumulates moral experience and hones her sense of moral perception, her
approach to moral decisions moves closer to that of applying a general theory. It is
unavoidable. Even the continually poised agent, who can place each moral decision in
the context of previously-trained perception and still interpret each additional decision
freshly, will inevitably make connections and references to successful learning, and, as
this stock of successful learning increases, the ability to make these connections will
increase also. A decision arising from keen, thorough, and sympathetic perception need
not be novel. Nussbaum recognizes this process in the term of a person’s life, but we can
easily imagine its application to a family, a community, and, eventually, to the succession
of generations. A perceptive agent will remain aware and does not act from convention.
Yet, even though one is continually perceptive and aware, each moral decision brings her
one step closer to an eventually antecedent general theory. This is not what Nussbaum
wants.
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Therefore, she does not discuss moral decisions in these terms of standard
dialectic, which leads to the second problem. Instead, as already discussed, she offers us
a stasis of sorts, which she calls perceptive equilibrium. Here, accumulated moral
knowledge exists as a body o f incommensurable values and experiences— a mosaic that,
when taken as a whole, contributes to practical wisdom. We compare situations of moral
decision to this body, finding pieces of similarities and differences that contribute to our
method of rich perception. In this version of dialectic, incorporation of new experience
does not occur via sublation, and negativity is not resolved. It is an ever-growing body of
practical experience and increasing wisdom, where dialectical incorporation consists of
properly placing a new situation in relation to parts of the accumulated body and that
maintains the uniqueness of incommensurable values without necessarily resolving them.
This version works well within the context of Love’s Knowledge, where Nussbaum’s
emphasis is on the process of moral judgment. Again, however, we are left with the
problem, beyond the process, of finding a consistent position within the dialectic’s
resultant equilibrium, both to connect together what already exists and to provide
guidance for future decisions.
Both versions of dialectic can accommodate conflict, and they can change
accordingly; neither claims a static, categorical correctness, and they grow according to
context. They differ in that the result of the standard dialectic process is a new, coherent
entity. Sublation involves a merging and transformation into a cohesive unit that leaves
behind the contributing components. Further, it can have a critical mass from which its
incorporation of a negative position may be to negate it, still transforming itself into a
new entity. It represents a substantial critical position.
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In contrast, perceptive equilibrium, as Nussbaum describes it, cannot claim such a
stance. It has no coherent foundation intrinsic to each of its incommensurables grounding
its array of accumulated moral experiences. To call this body practical wisdom or to
understand it as a unified, singular set is to place an organizing framework on, or
subjectively deduce one from, this equilibrium of individually-grounded decisions that
are the results of individual sets of particulars. Such a framework, however, does not
represent a necessary coherence that runs like a common thread through all of them.105
Indeed, the practical wisdom of perceptive equilibrium may contain simultaneous,
contradictory positions. And this is exactly what Nussbaum wants and what she
promotes in her discussion of the incommensurability of values. After all, it does reflect
our lives.
The problem with perceptive equilibrium as a normative position, then, is that it
contains no inherent cohesion. The organizing framework we are calling morality or
practical wisdom is one we designate, subjecting it to both competing frameworks and to
potential future perceptions. Because of the uniqueness resulting from the details of a
particular moral situation, and because of the unique array of individual moral decisions
within a single person’s life, there is no reason to suspect that two individuals will
understand the details of a moral judgment situation in the same way. Subject to
whatever perceptions perception may bring, an understood conception of morality can be
dismantled at any time, as Nussbaum describes, by a novel or challenging set of
particulars.
Here, Nussbaum’s appeal to human essentialism resurfaces as a strong candidate
for this common thread. Could we not, from this essentialism, recognize commonality
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among all people, thereby assigning an inherent dignity— grounded not in abstractions of
reason, but in concrete, lived observations of common humanity—to each person? Could
this not serve as a normative, critical position for organizing and directing the various
decisions made within a morality of perception? More importantly, could it not only
unify the experiences of a single person but represent also a substantial foundation for
relating the moral experiences of different people? As Nussbaum notes in her rejection
of metaphysical realism, “The failure to take an interest in studying our practices of
analyzing and reasoning, human and historical as they are, the insistence that we would
have good arguments only if they came from heaven—all this betrays a shame before the
human. On the other hand, if we really think of the hope of a transcendent ground for
value as uninteresting and irrelevant, as we should, then the news of its collapse will not
change the way we do things: it will just let us get on with the business of reasoning in
which we were already engaged.” 106
Initially, it appears that the answer to the above questions is yes. Unless we
appeal to some conception of metaphysical realism, a morality derived from an internalist
understanding of humanness will include a starting point similar to Nussbaum’s
essentialism. However, we can make a distinction within an internalist understanding of
humanness, one Nussbaum does not make, from which we can offer a foundation for
morality that does not rely on Nussbaum’s essentialism and presents a final rejection of
her method. The distinction is subtle, but it is not without a difference, and I will develop
it further in the next section. For now, however, it observes that, within an internalist
account of human essentialism, there are two ways to ground morality.

91

Nussbaum overlooks this distinction because, in her emphasis on an internalist
understanding of humanness that is motivated by a rejection of any claims of a
metaphysics, she fails to consider the force of material context when describing her
account of internalist essentialism. Similar to her critique of the Academy’s default
acceptance of relativism as the only alternative to metaphysical realism, she too, in her
rejection of a metaphysical realism, moves too far away from the position she rejects.
Although she argues for a normative position grounded in essentialism and revealed
through perception, thus contrasting it with both relativism and metaphysical realism, the
primary role she gives to perception places too much emphasis on the subjective
interpretation of this understanding. The distinction she overlooks, then, notes that
within a position of internalist essentialism we may also emphasize the force of the
material context without stepping away from perception into abstract metaphysical
realism.
Once we note this distinction between two emphases within an internalist account
of human essentialism, we can make two objections that provide a final rejection of
Nussbaum’s account of essentialism and her method’s connection to it while still
allowing us to preserve an internalist account of essentialism. Each of the two objections
reveals where Nussbaum’s emphasis on the subjective interpretation of an internalist
essentialism falls short. Each also suggests where a greater emphasis on the material
context of this internalist understanding would avoid the shortcomings of Nussbaum’s
method. The first objection claims that Nussbaum’s account of essentialism cannot
provide a substantive base to ground and connect the various instances of individual
perceptions because this essentialism itself is subjective and susceptible to redefinition.
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The second objection observes that Nussbaum’s account of essentialism can offer
grounding only within a social context and fails to offer a foundation for moral guidance
when we are alone. In the remainder of this section, I will address these two objections
to Nussbaum’s account, explaining for each why it presents difficulty for her method. In
the next section, I will offer an alternate approach to grounding a theory of morality that
relies on the material emphasis of the distinction within an internalist account of
humanness.
As described in this section, Nussbaum offers a description of essentialism to both
establish a foundation for a method of moral decision making and counter the default
relativism that accompanies a rejection of metaphysical realism. However, her
discussion struggles to provide a basis for continuity between moral decisions. Her
account of essentialism, understood internally, falls short of its grounding role because
this essentialism is itself subject to perception.
For Nussbaum, the locus of moral judgment within an internalist understanding of
humanity rests with perception. It is, thus, ultimately the product not only of the details
of a particular situation, but also of a perceiver’s filtering understanding of these details.
As described in the previous section, in her emphasis on perception Nussbaum rejects the
use of prior formulations for moral guidance. However, without an underlying orienting
framework, particulars do not give guidance unless we subjectively interpret overlaps and
similarities among those particulars as “morality.” The difficulty with this approach, of
particular import here, is that the perceiver’s ability to interpret those details is not itself a
constant. It, too, is a contingent detail of a particular situation. To depend on the
perceiver’s ability to perceive, orient, and interpret places great faith in each member of
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humanity and assumes sufficient perspicacity on the part of all perceivers. Yet,
Nussbaum herself admits that, at times, even the most perceptive agent will lose focus
when immersed in the full experience of a moment, resulting in perceptive oscillation.
We can only imagine what perception by others, such as those raised in negligent
households who do not know the security and depth of loving relationships, might look
like.
This problem of subjective perception creates problems for an essentialism
derived from within an internalist understanding, because a conception of essentialism is
itself, even as Nussbaum describes it, subject to interpretation and therefore cannot
provide a rebuttal to a critique of subjectivism. In other words, although Nussbaum’s
conception of essentialism appears to be sufficient and solid, if this understanding of
human essentialism changes radically, then we are left holding on to nothing. There is,
then, a further level on which subjective perception is problematic in addition to the role
it plays in individual decisions. If a major transition occurs in our understanding of
human essentialism, through which we understand human-qua-human in a way that does
not coincide with Nussbaum’s description of essentialism, then the coherence provided
by her essentialism can no longer serve as a substantial normative foundation for our
otherwise distinct moral situations. Nussbaum leaves morality exposed to the peril of the
potential of a radically changed understanding of humanness.
Yet, who can disagree with her conception of essentialism? Here, Nussbaum’s
discussion of essentialism reveals her contextual position in history. That is, it fits now,
offering a sufficient and solid account for humanness. Were this understanding of
humanness to change— as the rapid progression of technological innovation suggests
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could happen—this “business of reasoning in which we were already engaged” could
look very different.
At the end of “Aristotelian Essentialism,” she offers a short narrative myth about
essentialism, in which another planet houses human-like creatures that descended long
ago from humans. They lack several features Nussbaum considers essentially human,
and, therefore, we are led to conclude that they are not human. Specifically, in addition
to physical differences, they “have discarded— not just in theory but in the fabric of their
daily lives—the Earthly tendencies of thought that link the perception of one’s neighbor’s
pain to the memory of one’s own and the perception of a stranger’s pain to the experience
of a neighbor’s, all this through the general idea of the human being and human
flourishing.”107
This story accomplishes two goals for Nussbaum. First, it demonstrates in
narrative what she has described in the previous pages of the essay. Second, it allows her
to argue that her version of essentialism is correct; any other compilation of features, as
exhibited by these other creatures, would not be that of humans. Her approach to
morality, then, is applicable to us, as humans, for it coincides inextricably with this
essentialism. It is evident that we do not hold the inhabitants of this other planet to our
moral standards— our moral understanding does not apply—because they are not human.
In this, she presents a circular argument for her thesis, claiming that, as long as conditions
are as they are, then our moral obligations are as she has explained.
A little thought experiment, however, reveals a problem with her story. If we do
not give these creatures physical appearances different from ours and we do not place
them on another planet, but, rather, we distinguish a subset of people via another
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characteristic Nussbaum considers essential, then we have a grave problem. Consider,
for example, the no longer distant and unimaginable potentials of biotechnology. Future
parents already have the ability to select for certain genetic features; what if abnormallyextended lifespans were an option for those who could afford it? The gap between the
wealthiest and poorest citizens of the world, even within the United States, is such that it
is not impossible to imagine such physical enhancements for some and not for others.
What if these people sought to associate only with others in a similar condition? What if,
after many years, they began to understand themselves as different? What if they chose
to reproduce primarily with each other? Although this may seem extreme, we can easily
project the potentials of this near-future technology, and we can extrapolate from other
situations where we have become acclimated to an otherwise repugnant concept. It does
not require a cynical mind to suggest that the potential for profitability, mixed with
proper marketing and lobbying, can transform previously held standards.
Memory altering drugs are another recent technology.. What if those who could
afford it could selectively remove certain memories? Although we currently direct this
developing technology toward those who have faced extreme circumstances, such as
abuse, rape, or war trauma, we can easily imagine where market forces would eventually
broaden the tolerable application of this technology. If we extrapolate from the currently
broadening application of pain medications, we can imagine where memory altering
drugs, designed for a specific, well-intentioned use, could also become easily accessible.
The past seventy-five years of our human history has seen several instances of
attempted genocide. Why should it seem distant that a select group of humans could
begin to see themselves, through genetic enhancement or selective memory, as different

96

from others? By removing recognized kinship, they are not human by Nussbaum’s
definition. The point here is not science fiction. Rather, it is to show that a one-eyed
race of giants on another planet misguides Nussbaum in framing her example. Instead, if
we imagine two different groups of people existing on the same planet, one of which
defines itself outside the parameters of the moral legislation derived from Nussbaum’s
conception of human essentialism, then the two groups are not bound by the same
obligations. We, instead, find ourselves back at Bernard Williams’ discussion of moral
skepticism. What if a group of people, specifically those who through their ability to
access the technologies above have distinguished themselves from the rest, simply opt
out? To what do we appeal without shared essentialism?
The second objection also becomes visible when we make a distinction between
the emphases in an internalist understanding of human essentialism. In L ove’s
Knowledge and “Aristotelian Essentialism,” Nussbaum’s description of moral decisions
has a notable bias. She provides an effective method for navigating, through careful
perception, the ethics of human relations. She describes how to approach unique,
individual situations calling for moral judgment, including the appropriateness of our
personal, emotional responses to the decision. She also describes the threshold of human
essentialism to guide us through decisions of broader policy, both within a single
government and for use internationally. In both contexts, unique, individual situations
and broader policy, she focuses her discussion of morality on human relationships. How
do I respond toward this person in this particular situation? How do I act sensitively
given this other person’s needs? How do we protect the dignity of a particular social
class in light of hundreds of years of established, cultural discrimination?
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In this context of relationships, Nussbaum’s work is to be commended for
properly retrieving morality from abstract realms and reinstating it as a human function.
After all, if we cannot justify an act of generosity with love, or sympathy, rather than
reason, we function robotically and apart from a major aspect of our lives. However,
Nussbaum limits her discussion of morality to human relations only, and the problems of
sufficient grounding for her theory become especially clear when we change the context
for perception as morality.
That is, both her discussion of perception as morality and her description of
human essentialism do not give us any suggestions for guiding our moral lives when we
are alone. As I discussed in the introduction, the gravitas we associate with morality is
particularly manifest in the presence of others, but the situation is different when we are
by ourselves.
When we are alone, perception as morality fails us, for there is no greater
accountability for our perception—no other person or broader context to serve as a foil
for our interpretation of our perceived needs. Alone, I am free to perceive, in as much
sensitive detail as possible, that today’s installment of Oprah is more suited to my
particular needs at this time than is a walk through the winter hills behind my house. I
am free to take my moral cues from Nora Roberts rather than Henry James—perhaps for
reasons as basic as the accessibility of the prose of each. In the same way that the
particular details of an individual situation involving human interaction dictate our
decisions, such as navigating the gradations of truth and white lies, so also the details of a
situation where we are alone guide our decisions. The crucial difference, however, is that
decisions made in response to contingencies within the context of relationships have their
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focus somewhere other than on me solely. If I have had a long day at work, I am still
responsible to the other person in the common moral space we share. Alone, after a long
day, however, weariness may be the primary factor influencing my perception of my
needs.
There is no need to elaborate this further. What Nussbaum gives us is a thorough
account for perception and moral judgments within the context of relationship, and any
consideration of the moral life when I am alone reveals her method to be lacking. The
reason for this lack is her method’s ultimate grounding in subjective perception.
Both objections become evident only when we make a distinction within an
internalist understanding of human essentialism. We may, as Nussbaum does, emphasize
subjective perception as the mode of understanding our morality, but this exposes an
account of essentialism to the vagueness of our perceptions, relinquishing a conception of
essentialism to changed understandings of humanness. It also fails to provide moral
guidance when we are alone. If, however, we make this distinction within internalist
essentialism, recognizing subjective perceptions as fitting into a broader context that is
itself still an internalist conception, then we can provide a more sufficient and substantial
basis for moral guidance without reaching into metaphysical realism.
The need, then, is to begin with Nussbaum’s redirection of the moral focus from
abstract realms to the concrete particulars of our daily lives, but to develop it in a way
that does not reduce a conception of morality to the individual situations calling for moral
judgment. By placing perception in a broader material context, we respond to each of the
two objections, providing an internalist account of essentialism less subjective than
Nussbaum’s and able to provide moral guidance when we are alone.
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9. Alternative Position: Centered Coherence

Any critique must depart from some initial position. Here, I have critiqued Kant’s
approach to moral theory for its abstraction from the experience he sought to guide. His
position is ultimately one of rational reductionism. Although I hold that Nussbaum’s
alternative closely resembles our tangible process of moral judgment, I have also
presented the argument that her approach is one of empirical reductionism. Were I to
stop here, it would appear from these two critiques that I reject any kind of moral
reductionism. This is not the case.
As I described in the introduction, we understand the presence of morality in our
lives. Whether, in our grasp of morality, we see this is a dichotomous moral, not-moral
position or the more holistic question “How should one live?” we recognize some
distinction between actions that are better and actions that are worse. We approve of
individual actions and social policies while scorning others. We readily recognize acts of
kindness and examples of courage, both public and private, and we readily disapprove of
cruelty and laziness, both public and private. Again, whether we attribute this
recognition to social conditioning or some greater metaphysics, it is the case that we
possess some conception of morality and a corresponding sense of value. 108 This
conception is something to which we attribute significant gravity and, importantly, is one
we are willing to defend.
This gravity and defense encourage reduction in morality. In order to back up our
moral positions, which represent some of our most deeply held beliefs, we seek the
decisive foundation of an Archimedean point, that which is unquestionable. For Kant,
this is the a priori, universal, and necessary realm of reason. For Nussbaum, this point is
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known a posteriori in the concrete particulars of shared human experience and ultimately
defined in the details of each experience. The reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum are
similar in that they both focus, although with very different emphases, on single
moments. The moment of decision for Kant is so narrow in its scope that an agent is
morally accountable for the judgment itself only, and there is no accountability for the
agent’s success in enacting the decision. Moral judgment for Nussbaum focuses on the
particular details of a single decision, limiting both the moral moment and a greater
conception of a moral whole to the particular situation at hand. By emphasizing concrete
particulars, Nussbaum does offer a richer reductionism than Kant. Her characteristic
phrase “finely aware and richly responsible” suggests more than the rhetoric of moral
obligation, but even this more robust account cannot respond to the two objections I
raised in the previous section.
As an alternative to the reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum, I would like to
sketch how we might think differently about reductionism. My position is reductionist in
that, if pressed, it will claim a defendable foundation. However, it differs from the
reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum in that it seeks a broader foundation; it is reducible
to an Archimedean whole, rather than a point. Its locus is not the narrow, abstracted
realm of reason; it is likewise not the narrow, though rich, set of details defining a
particular situation. Rather, it seeks to combine these in a way that gathers the individual
perceptions known to us through experience under a common banner of cohesion.
Importantly, this moral foundation is a theme that courses through these various
experiences, and not an interpretive framework we assign to them in reflection.
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I will proceed with the awareness that the following discussion will be tentative.
This comes partly from the incomplete nature of a sketch, and partly because it borrows
from other, established systems. Kant’s system of morality received much of its strength
from the underlying logical consistency of his greater metaphysics. Transcendental logic
works as a whole; it is irresponsible to simply remove a section for use elsewhere. Thus,
where borrowing occurs, it will be done selectively and carefully in an attempt to avoid
this carelessness.
This alternate perspective begins with a consideration of the following two
statements:
• Our perceptive actions have meanings (and we may connect them into a
greater whole).
• A perceptive action has meaning because it is part of a greater whole.
These statements have several similarities. Both recognize meaning and value as
revealed through experience. Both are consistent with a position of internalist
essentialism. (The latter, although resembling claims of metaphysical realism, does not
depend on the existence of a universal and timeless in-itself or on any form of the
transcendental.)
The first statement represents Nussbaum’s perceptive equilibrium, where
decisions are made in response to particulars and overarching coherence is secondary.
Concrete perceptions “hang beautifully together” as an equilibrium that is “always ready
to reconstitute itself in response to the new.”
The second statement implies something more. It too is essentialist. That is, it
agrees with Nussbaum’s statement that the “deepest examination of human history and
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human cognition from within still reveals a more or less determinate account of the
human being, one that divides its essential from its accidental properties.”109 This
position differs from Nussbaum, however, on the basis of the distinction mentioned in the
previous section. It rejects an internalist conception of morality that is inseparable from
perception. A position that does not seek a foundation apart from perception defers its
composition to this perception, for it lacks an intrinsic cohesiveness and critical
standpoint that can appeal to that cohesiveness. Instead, I suggest that the distinction be
made, within an internalist understanding of humanness, grounding this understanding in
a subjective and an objective component. The former does not suggest abstraction or
relativism; the latter does not rely on metaphysical realism. Rather, the latter seeks a
broader foundation for this essentialism, one that can provide moral guidance when we
are alone as well as when we are in relationship and that can contest arbitrary or changing
conceptions of humanness.
There is a recognized trade off here. Kant’s system, although abstract, provides
an absolute foundation. Nussbaum’s method, although lacking the cohesiveness of
Kant’s system, grounds morality securely in the most tangibly-known aspects of our
experience. By remaining somewhat distant from both, this alternate reductionism,
paradoxically, relinquishes the full security provided by these two other methods. It
instead brings us back into Bernard Williams’ discussion, where we realize morality is a
different game.
In “The Moral First Aid Manual,” Daniel Dennett describes what a guide for
morality might look like. Regarding the issue of security, he states, “One cannot expect
there to be a single stable solution to such a design problem, but rather a variety of
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uncertain and temporary equilibria, with the conversation-stoppers tending to accrete
pearly layers of supporting dogma which themselves cannot withstand extended scmtiny,
but which do actually serve on occasion, blessedly, to deflect and terminate
consideration.” At first, this sounds quite a bit like Nussbaum, but he continues: “It
might seem then that ‘rule worship’ of a certain kind is a good thing, at least for agents
designed like us. It is good not because there is a certain rule, or set of rules, which is
provably the best, or which always yields the right answer, but because having rules
works— somewhat— and not having rules doesn’t work at all.”110 We need rules, norms,
or landmarks. Williams suggests in the postscript to Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy
that we begin with truth, truthfulness, and the meaning of an individual life. That is,
while we must recognize the shifts and rearrangements of the furniture within morality as
we gain deeper understandings of ourselves through perception, science, and experience,
we must also identify and rank those pieces of furniture, recognizing that rearrangement
and refinishing is different from claiming that all pieces of furniture are equally
important. Not having rules or landmarks from which to gain orientation does not work.
Bernard Williams suggests that we consider rationality as one such piece of
furniture, although the skeptic or the dogmatist, functioning autonomously apart from any
moral norm, may simply choose to be irrational. I suggest instead, in keeping with
Nussbaum, that a moral outlook does not overemphasize rationality, but instead borrows
a concept related to rationality: coherence. This does not reach for the categorical
universality of Kantian morality, and it recognizes perceptive equilibrium and oscillation
as lacking the unification required for sufficient guidance. In exchange for the security
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otherwise provided by rational or empirical reductionism, it offers a broad but definable
concept, coherence known in experience.
The following is a sketch of some tenets for coherence as a foundation for
morality. I will discuss two components of this. First, I will discuss how coherence
functions within an internalist understanding of humanness and how it establishes
standards while being receptive to rich perception. Second, I will discuss where we need
to,look for guidance in delineating a morality of coherence.
A position of coherence is ultimately reductionist, but, importantly, its does not
narrow to a single point. By its essence, it is a whole; the locus of a morality focused on
coherence reaches outside human nature. This does not mean it is distinct from human
nature, only that human nature, and its perception, is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for grounding it. Here, a distinction made by Hannah Arendt is helpful. In The
Human Condition, she separates human nature from the human condition, noting that
“the sum total of human activities and capabilities which correspond to the human
condition does not constitute anything like human nature.”111 In making this distinction,
she notes that human nature—the essentialism Nussbaum discusses— is insufficient for
describing the human life. Rather, a full account must recognize that human life is
contained within a material context. She states, “The human condition comprehends
more than the conditions under which life has been given to [humanity].. . . Whatever
touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the
character of a condition of human experience.” Further, “Whatever enters the human
world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of the human
condition.. . . The objectivity of the world—its object- or thing-character—and the
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human condition supplement each other; because human existence is conditioned
existence, it would be impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated
articles, a non-world, if they were not the conditioners of human experience.”112
From this, we can better understand the subjective-objective distinction within an
internalist understanding of humanness and therefore morality. We do not live in a
timeless universe, as Kant has it, nor does our understanding of morality reside in the
context of human-to-human relations only or in the confines of an individual situation.
Rather, morality, as related to the full context of humanness, must address the greater
human condition. Its foundation must be one where the emphasis does not rest with a
subjective interpretation of perception.
For this reason, coherence gives us a good starting place. Importantly, we must
recognize at the outset that this coherence becomes visible in a phenomenological
description. It is understood internally and does not appeal to a metaphysical foundation.
Importantly, it represents a conception of the good and can thus serve as an orienting
framework. We can define this coherence both negatively and positively.
Negatively, it recognizes strong dissonance in our lives as significant and
problematic, a deviation from the understood good. This is not an appeal to the complete
unification of experience; periods of perceptive equilibrium are allowed. However, if
morality is to provide guidance, then coherence as a moral position cannot offer a blanket
acceptance of dissonance in the name of incommensurability and Nussbaumian dialectic.
For example, we have a strong scientific understanding of what human physical health
looks like and what diminishes this health or adds to it. Certain foods and activities,
whose independent values we may perceive to be worthwhile to us and in certain contexts
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may be acceptable and even good, are incommensurable with this overall conception of
health. A moral discussion must be able to name a generally sedentary lifestyle, a diet of
frozen, processed lunches and suppers, or non-genetic obesity as dissonant with the
coherence of health in accord with our physical and psychological needs. Given our
known description of human overall health, derived from an internalist understanding of
humanness but grounded more broadly (in science also rather than in subjective
perception only), we would never condone such a lack of activity and unhealthy diet.
Instead, we could name and prescribe certain actions and behaviors as better.
Positively, coherence represents the phenomenological experience and
understanding of participation in something greater than that which is immediately
apparent. Again, this is known in experience and does not appeal to a separate
metaphysical reality. It functions along the concept of synergy, where the whole of the
experience is qualitatively different than the sum of its parts, and is evident as a sense of
transcendence. This transcendence need not be religious or spiritual (although it does not
dismiss the validity of religion). We know it in the experience of art, both for the
performer or creator and the observer. We know it in the exuberance of mind and body
after a strenuous physical activity. We know it in the midst of an overwhelming natural
landscape, whether grandiose or utterly simple. We know it in the emotions of love, hurt,
and sympathy a person comes to be present in. Importantly, in all of these, we recognize
that content comes from the intrinsic dignity of a greater setting. Neither the perceiver
nor the context solely defines the moment by itself, and only together do they describe
the full experience.
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From these negative and positive sketches of coherence as a foundation for a
conception of morality, we can see how a centered and situated coherence might provide
a valid alternative to the reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum. In contrast to it, we see
how dry Kant’s reductionism really is. Although he provides a foundation that is
seemingly categorical and universal, it removes us from those aspects of our lives we find
most powerful. Our physical bodies and emotional intelligences contribute too
significantly to our understanding of value to be ignored. We also see how Nussbaum’s
method of perception as morality focuses too narrowly on details and thus cannot provide
sufficient guidance within relationships and fails to address our moral lives as anything
other than perceptual. As an alternative to the rejection of these two systems, centered
coherence offers an outlook on our moral lives that reflects the tangible details we
actually experience while offering sufficient landmarks for navigation. It can define what
is immoral, both when we are in relationship and when we are alone, and it can also offer
a conception of the good beyond what is blameless. It recognizes individual value and
incommensurability, but it can still define some standard by which certain
incommensurables, perhaps those that remain perpetually unresolved, are understood as
blameworthy.
In exchange for this comprehensiveness, it offers a foundation that is not clearly
demonstrable. This foundation is sufficiently competent to reach into all aspects of our
lives, and, within these, it can provide detailed accounts of bad, good, and better.
However, situated coherence as a moral starting point, as a conception of the good,
represents the Archimedean foundation of a broad whole, not a definable point or set of
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points. It is not clearly definable like reason, and it is not concretely identifiable like
tangible details.
As a conception of the good, situated coherence provides, within an internalist
understanding of humanness and in the context of concrete particulars, an orienting
framework. It is teleological. This teleology need not be a Hegelian progression, and it
need not be one of movement, but it has directional emphasis. It claims better and worse,
this and not that, and in each case can state why. It can recognize deviations from this
conception of the good, including shifting understandings of humanness. If morality’s
role is to provide guidance among the contingencies of lived experience, then it must be
able to offer orientation, not just a method for perception. This is why Kant includes the
“Kingdom of Ends” expression of the moral law. It is an attempt to provide an orienting
framework for the categorical imperative to save it from the critique of emptiness, while
at the same time avoiding contingencies and heteronomy.
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Morality is not arbitrary,

and a grounding of coherence provides sufficient stability from which to provide
guidance. From within an internalist conception of humanness, it can name what is good
and thus guide our action.
Beginning with coherence, then, we can offer guidance for rich perception. We
can navigate the contingent details of a moral decision, still paying close attention to the
uniqueness of the situation. Yet, within this approach, morality’s shape is not dependent
on these details. On the other hand, this guidance is not a general, one size fits all
method. Rather, grounded coherence is an inherent quality of our internal conception of
humanness, and it reflects the significance and gravity we experience in our moral lives
as well as the comprehensive context—both individual details and broader connections—
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in which we live. This ability of coherence to provide a blend of gravity, orientation, and
perception can be seen most notably in centering acts of grace, such as the Bishop of
Digne’s response in Les Miserables when Jean Valjean is found to have his silver or in
the Christian Gospels when Jesus prevents the stoning of the woman caught in
adultery.114 Each of these actions arises from close perception of the particulars and is
incommensurable with a general mode of moral judgment (a system of exceptions to the
rule defeats the point of rules). Yet, these decisions are not dependent, secondary
responses to the particulars. Rather, each decision constitutes a greater conception of the
good, the center of a coherent spiritual whole for the person receiving the act of grace.
Each exhibits all the gravity, emotion, sensitive perception, and wholeness we want in
morality.
How do we begin to understand this coherence? How do we define and set its
parameters? Where do we look for its orientating landmarks? Coherence complies with
an internalist understanding of humanness. Even though it seeks a more objective
foundation than perception, it too connects up with the immediacy of human experience.
A source, sufficiently compelling and content-rich is needed. As these two examples
suggest, and as Nussbaum shows in her organic-connection thesis, narrative offers a
strong starting place. However, since coherence, and not narrative per say, is the
objective, one place we might look is the genre of grand narrative. Grand narratives
traditionally provided and, for many non-technologic ally advanced societies and religious
and social groups today, still provide the meta-level framework for orienting our
knowledge, including our morals. Hegel, for example, gives us one of the more
celebrated grand narratives—dialectics of Spirit— within philosophy. Others include the
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“hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the
creation of wealth.” 115 Likewise the dominant religious texts also offer similar grand
narratives. Lyotard defines grand narrative as a narrative with a “legitimating
function.”116 They require no further justification for their legitimization.
I refer to the use of grand narratives carefully and tentatively; Lyotard defines
grand narrative because he critiques it. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge, he traces the relationship of science and technology to knowledge, describing
the breakdown of science’s claims to legitimacy and the resultant dissolution of the grand
narrative within contemporary capitalist society. He explains,
Legitimation is the process by which a “legislator” dealing with scientific
discourse is authorised [sic] to prescribe the stated conditions (in general,
conditions of internal consistency and experimental verification)
determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for
consideration by the scientific com m unity.. . . The question of the
legitimacy of science has been indissociably linked to that of the
legitimation of the legislator since the time of Plato. From this point of
view, the right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to
decide what is just, even if the statements consigned to these two
authorities differ in nature. The point is that there is a strict interlinkage
between the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and
politics: they both stem from the same perspective, the same “choice” if
you will.117
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Lyotard notably defined postmodernism as characterized by “incredulity toward
metanarratives,” and we do not have to be fans of his to accept his rejection of grand
narratives.
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Further, we do not need to view the flux of language games Lyotard

proposes—perceptive equilibrium on a global scale—as a helpful alternative.119 Rather,
Lyotard’s role is important in recognizing the difficulties in establishing a single meta
narrative and critiquing the tendency of such narratives, from within their framework of
self-legitimization, to make claims of universality.
Thus, I do not suggest that we blindly accept any given one as the official,
definitive statement of human morality, but that we examine the primary function of
these narratives, their provision of orientation and their resultant relation to coherence.
Even though a singular, universal grand narrative cannot be legitimized, this does not
diminish the fact that the individual attempts at such a narrative accurately reflect much
of our internalist understandings of humanness. That said, a full discussion of grand
narrative requires adequate consideration of critical theory. I will save such a discussion
for a later time, but not without noting that criticism is either arbitrary and aimless or it
too departs from some cohesive center, however distant.
Grand narrative takes several forms, and from these forms we can understand
their orienting role, as well as begin to establish some basic criteria for wading through
their many claims. A grand narrative can represent and explain the metaphysical
worldview of a particular cultural group or broader society, such as can be found in the
creation stories of pre-technological societies. It can, as in the case of nationalism, tell
the story of a people, thus providing a sense of pride and belonging. A grand narrative
can, in the case of an institution such as democratic government, provide a
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comprehensive foundation for a wide array of policies and activities, and it can, as with
science, offer a validated, provable perspective. As the text of a religion, grand narrative
can follow the life of a single person, such as Jesus of Nazareth or Mohammed, unifying
various precepts under a single banner, or it can tell the story of a people, such as the
ancient Hebrews. Important to their role of orientation, grand narratives are not
individual snippets of narrative; they are not equivalent to myths, fables, stories, or
individual pieces of fiction. Rather, they seek to make connections between events and to
provide explanation, not just description. They thus orient us in moral space, offering us
a significant level of coherence.120 This orientation and meta-level connectivity
distinguishes them from the role individual works fiction, as passages or full texts, play in
perception.
Certain characteristics make grand narratives good starting places. First, as
narratives, they can include a rich array of context and details. They incorporate these
concrete tangibles into their accounts as inherent attributes—context is the nature of
narrative— reflecting key aspects of human life known and validated through experience.
Nussbaum provides full explanation of the value of this. Beyond Nussbaum’s
explanation, however, grand narratives provide a mode for relating perception to broader
context.
As narratives, however, they are told; that is, there is a voice to the teller. Lyotard
describes the subject in the telling of a narrative as “obligated in the way of a relay that
may not keep its charge but must pass it on.”

10 1

For Lyotard, this telling is a diminution

and anti-privileging of the subject, and we can agree that it spreads the locus of the moral
moment away from the teller of the story. In arguing this, Lyotard sought to reduce the
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autonomous role of the subject and thus the ability to claim the superiority of any
particular narrative over others. However, the telling of a narrative also subjects the
account to the occasional twists and turns of the speaker. There is, then, a flexibility
within grand narratives. Although they are meta-level accounts, they must reflect our
internalist understandings of humanness; they must be communicable, emanating from
the teller and resonating with their recipients.
As stated, this is a sketch. It is incomplete in its telling, and there are many
problems and objections to be dealt with at a later time. The primary objection, however,
notes that there are many grand narratives, requiring us not only to choose among them
but also to explain how we made this choice. If grand narratives reflect our internalist
understandings of humanness according to a situated teller and recipient, then they take
us right back into the problem of subjectivism, only on the larger scale of orienting
worldview.
To address this objection, we can begin by noting that anyone who is able to
provide necessary and sufficient moral norms must speak from within some centered
coherence. This position may be vague or incompletely understood, but it still provides
the required grounding for understanding a robust and generally orienting morality.
Importantly, a centered coherence is a position we have chosen. Although we interact
with, and are influenced by, our material environment, we are not controlled by it, and we
act autonomously within it.
The problem of plurality remains, however. Even though grand narratives arise
from positions of centered coherence and help us identify the important landmarks within
them, the grounding of grand narratives within a centered coherence still leaves the
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problem of a pluralism of centered coherence. To take an account of essentialism, such
as Nussbaum’s, and make it complete by integrating it with its material context, in
whatever particular form this context takes, inevitably results in this type of pluralism.
However, the key difference between this pluralism and the pluralism of an antiessentialist relativism is that each instance of centered coherence offers both the
necessary and sufficient conditions to construct a substantial, grounded, and non-arbitrary
moral orientation. A pluralism of centered coherence does not, then, resemble at all the
arbitrariness of pluralistic relativism.
After recognizing this crucial difference, the important next step is to identify the
various instances of centered coherence and begin a careful conversation across the
borders of our moral universes.
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m ost effective institution o f libidinal deployment. Thus, there can be no original originality, no critical
position that is not o f a relation to capitalism . “The em ergence o f a new deployment, ‘radical,’ critical [is]
inside the womb o f the old” (“Adorno as the D ev il,” p. 129). Both negativity and critique are dependent
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